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Abstract
Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective
situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper
shows that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff representation cause
pronounced differences in nominal price inertia indicating the behavioral
importance of money illusion. In particular, if the payoff information is presented
to subjects in nominal terms, price expectations and actual price choices after a
fully anticipated negative nominal shock are much stickier than when payoff
information is presented in real terms. In addition we show that money illusion
causes asymmetric effects of negative and positive nominal shocks. While nominal
inertia is quite substantial and long-lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small
after a positive shock.
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11. Introduction
Until recently, the notion of money illusion seemed to be thoroughly discredited in
modern economics. Tobin (1972:3) described the negative attitude of most economic theorists
towards money illusion as follows: “An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater
crime than to assume money illusion.” As a consequence, for several decades money illusion was
anathema to the profession. The index of the Handbook of Monetary Economics (Friedman and
Hahn 1990), for example, does not even mention the term “money illusion”. In principle, money
illusion could provide an explanation for the inertia of nominal prices and wages and, thus, for
the non-neutrality of money. The stickiness of nominal prices and wages seems to be an
important phenomenon (see e.g. Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996, Bernanke and Carey 1996,
Bewley 1998, Blinder 1990, Card and Hyslop 1998, Kahn 1997). It has puzzled economists for
decades because it is quite difficult to explain in an equilibrium model with maximizing
individuals. Instead of money illusion other factors like informational frictions (Lucas 1972),
staggering of contracts (e.g., Fischer 1977, Taylor 1979), costs of price adjustment (Mankiw
1985) and near-rationality (Akerlof and Yellen 1985) have been invoked to explain nominal
inertia.
In this paper we do not contest the potential relevance of these explanations. We do,
however, argue that money illusion has prematurely been dismissed as a potential candidate for
the explanation of sluggish nominal price adjustment. Our argument is based on rigorous
experimental evidence from a price setting game that isolates money illusion from other potential
determinants of nominal inertia. In particular, we show that after a fully anticipated negative
nominal shock, long-lasting nominal inertia prevails, even if informational frictions, costs of price
adjustment and staggering are absent. Our results indicate that the direct and indirect effects of
money illusion are the major determinant of this long-lasting nominal inertia. We show, in
addition, that money illusion causes much less nominal inertia after a fully anticipated positive
nominal shock. Our results suggest that this asymmetric effect is caused by a particular form of
money illusion that arises when some people take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs.
After a negative money shock nominal payoffs decline because prices tend to decline while after a
positive shock nominal payoffs increase because prices tend to rise. If these changes in nominal
payoffs are taken as a proxy for changes in real payoffs there will be more reluctance to adjust
prices to the new equilibrium after a negative shock.
Our experiments also allow us to judge the relative importance of the direct and indirect
effects of money illusion on nominal inertia. The direct effects of money illusion are defined as
2those effects that are the direct result of individual optimization mistakes. The indirect effects of
money illusion are defined as those effects that arise because some agents expect that others are
prone to money illusion and, as a consequence, they behave differently. The distinction between
the direct and the indirect effects of money illusion is important because many economists seem
to believe that money illusion is not a widespread phenomenon at the individual level, i.e., that
the direct effects of money illusion are small. The textbook example where all nominal prices and
nominal incomes are doubled nicely illustrates this view. It is hard to believe that many people
make an individual optimization mistake by choosing a different bundle of goods when prices and
incomes are doubled. Our results clearly show, however, that it would be misleading to conclude
that money illusion is largely irrelevant because the direct effects of money illusion are small. In
our experiments the direct effects of money illusion on nominal inertia after the negative shock
are also rather small but the total effects nevertheless are very large. The reason for this finding is
that money illusion renders price expectations very sticky after the negative shock, which in turn
induces agents to choose sticky prices. This result lends support to theories that stress that small
amounts of individual-level irrationality can have large aggregate effects (Akerlof and Yellen
1985, Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985 and 1989, Russell and Thaler 1985). Taken together, the
results of our experiments suggest that money illusion matters, i.e., money illusion should be
considered as a serious candidate in the explanation of nominal inertia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we discuss the notion of money
illusion and its potential aggregate implications in more detail. In section 3 we argue that
experimental methods are appropriate for studying whether money illusion matters and we
present our experimental design. In section 4 the experimental results of the design with the
negative nominal shock are presented. Section 5 argues that the nature of money illusion in our
experiment suggests that after a positive nominal shock there should be less nominal inertia. This
conjecture is tested in a design with a positive nominal shock. In the final section we summarize
and interpret our main results.
2. Money illusion at the individual and the aggregate level
2.1. Money illusion at the individual level
Leontief (1936) defined money illusion as a violation of the “homogeneity postulate”.
This postulate stipulates that demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in all
nominal prices, i. e., they depend only on relative and not on absolute prices. Although other
3authors have used slightly different definitions, the intuition behind their definitions seems to be
rather similar.3 This intuition says that if the real incentive structure, i.e. the objective situation an
individual faces, remains unchanged, the real decisions of an illusion-free individual do not
change either. Two crucial assumptions underly this intuition: First, the objective function of the
individual does not depend on nominal but only on real magnitudes. Second, people perceive that
purely nominal changes do not affect their opportunity set. For example, people have to
understand that an equi-proportionate change in all nominal magnitudes leaves the real
constraints unaffected. Whether people are, in fact, able to pierce the veil of money, i.e., whether
they understand that purely nominal changes leave their objective circumstances unchanged, is an
empirical question. Irving Fisher (1928), for example, was convinced that ordinary people are, in
general, prone to money illusion.
More recently Shafir, Tversky and Diamond (1997) provided interesting questionnaire
evidence indicating that frequently one or both preconditions for the absence of money illusion
are violated. Their results suggest that the preferences of many people as well as their perceptions
of the constraints are affected by nominal values. Moreover, the answers of many people do not
only indicate that they themselves suffer from money illusion but that they also expect other
people’s behavior to be affected by money illusion.
Since the absence of money illusion means that an individual’s preferences, perceptions
and, hence, choices of real magnitudes are not affected by purely nominal changes, it is natural to
view money illusion as a framing or representation effect. From this viewpoint an individual
exhibits money illusion, if his or her decisions depend on whether the same environment is
represented in nominal or real terms. There is a large body of experimental research that shows
that alternative representations of the same situation may well lead to systematically different
responses (Selten and Berg 1970, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Representation effects seem to
arise because people tend to adopt the particular frame that is presented and evaluate the options
within this frame. Because some options loom larger in one representation than in another,
alternative framings of the same options may provoke different choices.
It is important to note that the nominal representation of an economic situation is probably
the natural representation for most people. This is so because most economic transactions in
people’s lives involve the use of money and, hence, are framed in nominal terms. Therefore, it is
likely that people often perceive and think about economic problems in nominal terms which may
induce money illusion. A rather basic form of money illusion occurs, e. g., when people take
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takes into account the potential effect of people’s real wealth on their supply and demand behavior.
4nominal values or changes in nominal values as a proxy for real values or changes in real values,
respectively. Note that this rule of thumb makes perfect sense in an environment with a given
aggregate price level. However, this rule is inappropriate in situations where the aggregate price
level is changing. Therefore, the application of this rule in an environment with changing
aggregate prices constitutes a form of money illusion.
2.2. Money illusion at the aggregate level
In the past, economists frequently invoked the assumption of money illusion to account
for the short-run non-neutrality of money.4 However, since the success of the rational
expectations revolution economists have been extremely reluctant to invoke money illusion to
explain the short-run non-neutrality of money. While New Classical macroeconomists focus on
informational frictions to account for short-run non-neutrality (Lucas 1972), New Keynesians
mainly focus on costs of price adjustment or staggering (see e. g. Mankiw and Romer 1991).5 In
the absence of menu costs, staggering, and informational frictions, the models of New Keynesian
and New Classical economists rule out that purely monetary changes have real effects. A
common feature of these models is that they exclusively focus on the equilibrium states of their
economies. In general, they remain silent on how economic agents move from one equilibrium to
the other. In models that exclusively focus on equilibrium the assumption of the absence of
money illusion is very intuitive because it is difficult to imagine that an illusion could persist in
equilibrium. However, there is a strong a priori argument that money illusion is likely to affect
the adjustment process of an economy after a fully anticipated monetary shock. This argument is
based on the simple fact that in an interactive situation the failure of some agents to fully adjust to
the nominal shock will, in general, provide incentives for other agents to not fully adjust to the
shock, either. Thus, there may be a snowball effect that causes less than full adjustment for a
prolonged period of time.
This can be illustrated in the context of a monopolistically competitive economy as
analyzed in, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). To keep
the argument simple we focus solely on the firms’ behavior. The reduced form real profit function
for firms in these models can be written as
                                                          
4 Irving Fisher’s explanation of business cycles, for example, is based on lenders’ money illusion during an upswing.
Fisher believed that lenders are willing to supply more in the face of a rise in nominal interest rates although real
interest rates decline or remain unchanged due to inflation.
5 The near-rationality approach of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) can, in principle, be subsumed under the menu-cost
approach by stipulating “cognitive“ menu costs of maximizing behavior.
5(1) pii = pii(Pi/ P− , M/ P− ).
where pii is firm i’s real profit, Pi is the nominal price set by firm i, P−  is the aggregate price level
and M denotes the supply of money.6  In these models M/ P−  is proportional to real aggregate
demand. For simplicity, we assume identical firms, the absence of menu costs and informational
frictions, and a unique and symmetric equilibrium *Pi  = *Pj , for all i, j. In this equilibrium each
firm maximizes real profits by setting *Pi  = *P− . Since (1) is homogeneous of degree zero in Pi,
P−  and M, a change in M to λM (λ≠1) leads to post-shock equilibrium values of λ *Pi  and λ *P− .
Suppose now that there is one group of agents who suffers from money illusion and does,
therefore, not fully adjust their nominal prices to λ *Pi . Suppose further that there is a second
group of agents that anticipates the behavior of the first group. The second group, therefore,
anticipates a change in real aggregate demand M/ P−  such that their members, in general, have an
incentive to choose a price that differs from λ *Pi , too. Whether the interaction between these
groups causes aggregate nominal inertia depends in an important way on the strategic
environment, i. e., whether agents’ actions are strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) have shown that in the presence of strategic complementarity
between agents’ decisions the existence of a small group of non-rational subjects can have large
effects on the process of adjustment to equilibrium. In the above mentioned model of
monopolistic competition strategic complementarity means that firm i’s profit maximizing
nominal price ´Pi  is positively related to the aggregate price level P− . This means that firms
which believe that, because of money illusion, the prices of other agents are kept close to the pre-
shock equilibrium have a rational reason to choose a nominal price that is also close to the pre-
shock equilibrium.
Thus, under strategic complementarity rational firms have an incentive to partly imitate
the behavior of the non-rational firms which gives the latter a disproportionately large impact on
the aggregate price level. In contrast, in the presence of strategic substitutability, i. e., if ´Pi  is
negatively related to P− , rational firms have an incentive to partly compensate the behavior of the
non-rational ones so that the latter have a disproportionately small impact on the aggregate
outcome. The results of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) thus suggest that, given strategic
complementarity, the existence of a small group of subjects that suffer from money illusion may
generate substantial nominal inertia. However, while this is a plausible theoretical argument,
                                                          
6 Equation (1) already incorporates (i) the maximizing behavior of all households, (ii) the cost minimizing behavior
of all firms for given output and wages levels, (iii) the equilibrium real wage, and (iv) the equilibrium relation
between real aggregate demand and real money balances. In Akerlof and Yellen (1985) the real wage is given by
the Solow condition because firms are efficiency wage setters. In Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) households are
wage setters so that firms take real wages as given when choosing nominal prices and output.
6there is, to our knowledge, no empirical evidence for the claim that a small amount of money
illusion may generate substantial nominal inertia.7
3. An experimental approach to money illusion
One way to rigorously examine whether money illusion matters, is to look for a natural
experiment in which an exogenous and fully anticipated monetary shock occurs. The shock has to
be exogenous because if the central bank responds to real events in the economy there can be a
co-movement between money and output that has nothing to do with the real effects of money.
The shock has to be fully anticipated because nobody doubts that nominal inertia and real effects
occur in the presence of non-anticipated shocks. These effects should not be confounded with
money illusion.
Of course, in order to unambiguously identify whether the shock is fully anticipated the
researcher needs to know individual information sets before the shock. Moreover, to judge
whether the anticipated shock causes a disequilibrium and nominal inertia the researcher has to
know the equilibrium values of nominal prices before and after the shock. By comparing the pre-
and post shock equilibrium values of nominal prices with actual prices the researcher can identify
(i) to what extent actual prices are anchored at the pre-shock equilibrium and (ii) how long it
takes for actual prices to adjust to the new equilibrium. Furthermore, to examine whether money
illusion causes nominal inertia the researcher should identify two similar natural experiments. In
one experiment the “world“ should be framed in nominal terms while in the other experiment it
should be framed in real terms.
In our view, it seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to meet the above
requirements with field data. In fact, the exogeneity of monetary policy and the causality between
money and output is a matter of considerable debate (e.g., Romer and Romer 1989, 1994; Hoover
and Perez 1994; Coleman 1996). Whether monetary shocks are anticipated or not is usually
controversial, too. Belongia (1996) for example, shows that the measurement of unanticipated
money shocks may be quite sensitive to the choice of monetary aggregates. Moreover, full
                                                          
7 Since strategic complementarity is important for our argument in favor of the aggregate relevance of (beliefs about)
money illusion one would like to know to what extent it does prevail in naturally occurring economies. In fact,
several papers suggest that strategic complementarity may well be an important feature of real economies. It arises
frequently in imperfectly competitive labor and product markets. Strategic complementarity is an inherent feature
of models of monopolistic price competition (Ball and Romer 1987), it can arise from the nature of preferences and
technologies (Bryant 1983) or in environments in which heterogeneous agents search for transaction partners
(Diamond 1982). Oh and Waldman (1990, 1994), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) and Blinder, Canetti, Lebow and
Rudd (1998) provide evidence in favor of the relevance of strategic complementarity in real economies.
7knowledge of the pre- and post-shock equilibrium values of nominal prices is clearly beyond the
information content of presently available field data. Finally, as already mentioned in the
introduction, almost all business transactions are shrouded in nominal money, i. e., it is very
difficult to find real world examples of a real frame.
In an appropriate laboratory setting, however, the above mentioned data requirements can
be met. The techniques of experimental economics allow the implementation of exogenous and
fully anticipated nominal shocks and the experimenter can exert full control over pre- and post-
shock equilibrium values of nominal prices. In addition, the experimenter controls the framing of
the situation, e.g., whether subjects receive the payoff information in nominal or in real terms.
Finally, experimental methods also provide the opportunity to observe subjects’ behavior in
interactive and non-interactive settings that are otherwise structurally identical. These enhanced
control opportunities suggest that laboratory experiments provide valuable information regarding
the impact of money illusion on nominal inertia, which may complement and help to interpret the
results of studies based on field data.8
The use of experimental methods also distinguishes our examination from the study of
Shafir et al. (1997). While these authors asked subjects hypothetical questions we directly observe
subjects‘ behavior in our experiments. In our view the study of Shafir et al. neatly shows that
questionnaires can be a very useful instrument to examine the nature of money illusion at the
individual level. It is, however, also clear that it is impossible to examine aggregate effects of
individual interactions and adjustment processes with this method. For our purposes the most
important advantage of experimental methods, relative to questionnaires, is that we can directly
observe the evolution of individual and aggregate behavior after a nominal shock. This means, e.
g., that we can directly study the impact of the nominal frame, i. e., of money illusion, on the
evolution of price sluggishness after the shock.
3.1. General description of the experimental design
To study the impact of money illusion we designed an n-player pricing game with
strategic complementarity. The pricing game was divided into a pre-shock and a post-shock
phase. All n players had to determine their nominal prices in each period of the game. They were
                                                          
8 For field evidence related to the question of money illusion see e.g. Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976) and Niemi and
Lloyd (1981). Abbott and Ashenfelter estimate a system of commodity demand and labor supply functions and find
evidence that the system does not satisfy the homogeneity restriction. Niemi and Lloyd report the result that the
inflation rate has an independent impact on female labor supply.
8free to change their nominal prices in each period at no cost. The players interacted anonymously
via computer terminals. Each treatment condition had 2T periods. During the first T periods of a
session the money supply was given by M0. Then we implemented a fully anticipated monetary
shock by reducing the money supply to M1. This shock and the fact that the post-shock phase
again lasted T periods was common knowledge.
Our major interest concerns subjects’ pricing behavior in the post-shock phase. The pre-
shock phase serves the purpose to make subjects acquainted with the computer terminal and the
decision environment. In addition, and more importantly, the pre-shock phase allows us to see
whether subjects reach equilibrium in the pre-shock phase. After all, one can only argue that
money illusion is a disequilibrating force if equilibrium has in fact been reached before the shock.
The real payoff of subject i, pii, is given by
(2) pii = pii(Pi, iP−− , M) i = 1, ..., n
where Pi denotes i’s nominal price, iP−−  represents the average price of the other n-1 group
members while M denotes a nominal shock variable (money supply). The nominal payoff of
subject i is given by iP−− pii. In total, we have four treatment conditions and the payoff functions
(2) are the same in all conditions. The four conditions differ along two dimensions (see Table 1).
The first dimension concerns the framing of the situation, i. e., whether payoffs are represented in
real or in nominal terms. In the real treatments, denoted by RC and RH, subjects received the
payoff information in real terms while in the nominal treatments, denoted by NC and NH, payoffs
were represented in nominal terms. Thus, to compute their real payoffs in the nominal treatments
subjects had to divide their nominal payoffs iP−− pii by iP−− .
Insert Table 1 here
The second dimension concerns the fact whether our experimental subjects face n-1 pre-
programmed computerized players or whether they face n-1 other human subjects. The crucial
point here is that in the computerized condition, i. e., if one human subject faces n-1 pre-
programmed computers, the subject is informed about the aggregate response rule of the
computers in advance. The response rule of the computers is given by the best replies of the
computers (based on the computers’ payoff functions (2)). Therefore, there is no strategic
uncertainty and, hence, no need to form expectations about the behavior of the other players in
this condition. Moreover, since the computers play best replies their behavior rules out any money
illusion or any other form of irrationality. In contrast, in the condition with human opponents each
subject faces the task of forming expectations about the other players’ price choices. This
9necessarily also involves a guess about the extent to which other players are affected by money
illusion.
The condition with computerized players essentially boils down to an individual decision-
making experiment in which human subjects can maximize their money earnings by playing
optimally against the known aggregate best reply of the n-1 computerized players. Note that in the
computerized condition the indirect effects of money illusion, which operate via the expectations
that other players are affected by money illusion, can play no role because the computers play best
reply. This condition, therefore, allows us to examine to what extent money illusion has direct
effects on nominal inertia, i.e., to what extent it simply causes individual optimization mistakes.
In the condition with human opponents the indirect effects of money illusion can, in addition, also
play a role.
An important aspect of our design is that exactly the same payoff functions were
implemented in all treatment conditions. Moreover, we also ensured that there is a unique
equilibrium in each condition, and that the equilibrium price choices of all n players (human and
computerized) are identical across all conditions. Therefore, the only difference between the real
treatments RC and RH on the one hand and the nominal treatments NC and NH on the other hand
is, that in the real treatments subjects received the payoff information in real terms while in the
nominal treatments they received this information in nominal terms. The experimental design in
Table 1 allows to isolate various potentially important determinants of nominal inertia. The
treatments with a real payoff frame allow us, in particular, to isolate those determinants of
nominal inertia that have nothing to do with money illusion.
In the RC money illusion is ruled out at the individual and, hence, also the aggregate level.
Therefore, if we observe in the RC a slow adjustment of the nominal price chosen by the human
subject after the shock, money illusion cannot be the source of this nominal inertia. Instead, other
sources of individual irrationality must be responsible. Since the computers are programmed to
play a best reply to the choice of the human subject, any deviation from equilibrium must be due
to an optimization mistake of the subject.
In the NC, in contrast, money illusion can affect the behavior of individuals because as a
part of the individual optimization problem human subjects have to correctly deflate nominal
payoffs at the various (Pi, iP−− )-combinations. Hence, by comparing the post-shock prices of
human subjects in the RC and the NC we can observe whether there exists money illusion at the
individual level. If, e.g., nominal inertia is more pronounced in the NC than in the RC we would
have evidence in favor of individual-level money illusion.
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In the RH, as in the RC, individual-level irrationality other than money illusion can play a
role. However, in the RH the adjustment to the new post-shock equilibrium is not just an
individual optimization problem of the human subjects. In the RH adjustment to the new
equilibrium also involves the coordination of the expectations of all human subjects. Although
there exists a unique equilibrium it cannot be taken for granted that subjects instantaneously
succeed to act according to the new post-shock equilibrium. For example, if subjects play the
equilibrium before the shock for several periods, it may well be the case that after the shock some
subjects are anchored or believe that others are somehow anchored at the old equilibrium. As a
consequence, adjustment to the post-shock equilibrium may not occur instantaneously. Since in
the RC subjects face no coordination problem, we can isolate the amount of nominal inertia that
is due to the coordination problem by comparing the adjustment process in the RC and the RH. In
case that we find no individual irrationality in the RC the nominal inertia observed in the RH can
be fully attributed to the coordination problem present in the RH.
In the NH subjects face the same coordination problem as in the RH. We are, however,
particularly interested in the impact of adding the nominal frame to this coordination problem, i.
e., in a comparison of the NH and the RH. This comparison allows us to isolate the total effects
of money illusion in an environment where subjects face a coordination problem. The total effects
of money illusion in this environment consist of the direct effects of individual-level money
illusion as exhibited in the NC plus the indirect “multiplier” effects of individual-level illusion.
These “multiplier” effects may arise because in our setting with human opponents subjects with
money illusion can also affect the expectations and thus the behavior of the subjects without
money illusion.
3.2. General properties of the payoff functions
Before we proceed to the specific numerical parameters of our experiment, it is useful to
provide a general description of the payoff functions (2). They have the following properties:
(i) They are homogeneous of degree zero in Pi, iP−− ,-and M.
(ii) The best reply is (weakly) increasing in iP−− .
In addition, our functional specification9 of (2) implies that the equilibrium
(iii) is unique for every M,
(iv) is the only Pareto efficient point in payoff space, and
                                                          
9 The functional form is presented in Appendix A.
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(v) can be found by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Note that the real payoff pii does not depend on the average price P−  of all group members
but on iP−− . This feature makes it particularly easy to play a best reply for a given expectation
about the other players’ average price. If we made pii dependent on P− , so that Pi affects P− , it
would have been much more difficult for i to compute the best reply (see also below). It is also
worthwhile to point out that the nominal payoff for each subject i is given by iP−− pii and not by
P−pii. This makes the computation of the real payoffs from a given nominal payoff much easier
because the deflator is independent of one’s own price choice.
Properties (i) and (iii) above were implemented because our analysis focuses on the
impact of money illusion on the adjustment process of an economy with a unique money-neutral
equilibrium *Pi , i = 1, ..., n. To see that properties (i) and (iv) imply neutrality, note that a change
in M from M0 to λM0 leaves real payoffs unaffected if prices change to λPi and λ iP−− . Moreover,
if ´Pi , i = 1, ..., n, is a best reply to iP−−  at M0, λ ´Pi also is a best reply to λ iP−− , at λM0. Thus,
λ *Pi  for all i is the post-shock equilibrium.
Property (ii) captures strategic complementarity and was implemented for the reasons
given in section 2.2. In our pilot experiments we initially implemented a price-setting game with
monopolistic competition. However, it turned out that subjects quickly realized that under
monopolistic competition cooperative gains can be achieved by out-of-equilibrium behavior.
Therefore, both in the nominal as well as in the real frame, subjects systematically tried to
achieve real payoff gains through out-of-equilibrium behavior. Only towards the end of each
phase these attempts vanished. Thus, in the pre- as well as in the post-shock phase of our pilot
experiments adjustment towards equilibrium was strongly retarded by attempts to cooperate. To
remove this confound with the other sources of nominal inertia we chose payoff functions that
ensured that the equilibrium was the unique Pareto-efficient point in the whole payoff space
(property (iv)).
Finally, property (v) means that there is a method for finding the equilibrium that works
exactly in the same way in the real as well as in the nominal frame. Note that the framing of
payoffs has no impact at all on whether a particular strategy is (weakly) dominated. In the real
frame a (weakly) dominated strategy Pi has (weakly) smaller real payoff numbers at any level of
iP−− . In the nominal frame a (weakly) dominated strategy Pi has (weakly) smaller nominal payoff
numbers at any level of iP−− . Thus, to eliminate (weakly) dominated strategies in either frame,
subjects only need to eliminate those strategies that have (weakly) smaller (real or nominal)
payoff numbers at any given level of iP−− . Since in the condition with human opponents the best
12
reply function and, hence, the number of (weakly) dominated strategies is exactly the same under
the real and the nominal frame, there is, in the absence of money illusion, no reason why
adjustment should differ across the RH and the NH.
3.3. Experimental procedures and parameters
All major experimental parameters are summarized in Table 2. The experiment was
conducted in a computerized laboratory with a group size of n = 4. The group composition did
not change throughout the whole experiment, i.e., for 2T periods. In each group there were two
types of subjects: Subjects of type x and subjects of type y. Payoff functions differed among the
types. This difference implied that x-types had to choose a relatively low price in equilibrium
while y-types had to choose a relatively high price (see Table 2 for details). There is no particular
reason for our choice of the group size because there are no strong conjectures about the net
effects of a different group size. On the one hand, a larger group size, e. g., enhances the chances
that there are individuals with money illusion in a group. On the other hand, the relative impact of
an individual on average prices becomes smaller. With regard to the heterogeneity of the players’
payoff functions, the case of four different payoff functions would be the most realistic but also
the most complicated case. Therefore, we went for an intermediate solution with only two types
of players, i. e. two different payoff functions.10
Insert Table 2 here
In the pre-shock phase of each treatment the money supply was given by M0 = 42 while in
the post-shock phase it was given by M1 = M0/3 = 14. In the pre-shock equilibrium the average
price over all n group members is given by 0*P
−  = 18 while in the post-shock equilibrium it is 1*P
−
= 6. In the treatments with human opponents both the pre- and the post-shock phase consists of T
= 20 periods while in the treatments with computerized opponents T = 10. The reason for this
difference was that we expected that adjustment would take longer in the presence of a
coordination problem. For the purpose of comparing post-shock nominal inertia across treatments
it is crucial that the required adjustment, i. e. the difference between actual nominal prices in the
final pre-shock period and the new post-shock equilibrium price is roughly the same. To ensure
comparable adjustment requirements across treatments we gave players more time to reach the
equilibrium in the treatments with a coordination problem.
                                                          
10 The payoff functions of the two types were the same up to a parallel shift. Except for *Pk  and kP*− all parameters of
the payoff function specified in Appendix A are the same for both types.
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In each decision period subjects had to choose an integer Pi ∈ {1,2, …, 30}. In addition,
they had to provide an expectation about iP−−  which we denote by 
e
iP−− . Finally, subjects
indicated their confidence about their expectation eiP−−  by choosing an integer from 1 to 6 where 1
indicated that the subject is “not at all confident” while 6 indicated that he or she is “absolutely
confident”.11 This measure of confidence can be interpreted as an indicator of subjects’ perceived
uncertainty about the other players’ choices. Note that this uncertainty is an inevitable component
of the coordination problem that subjects face in the condition with human opponents. At the end
of each period each subject was informed about the actual realization of iP−−  and the actual real
payoff pii on a so-called “outcome screen“ (see Figure B2 in Appendix B). In addition, the
outcome screen provided information about the subject’s past choices of Pi, past realizations of
iP−−  and past real payoffs pii.
Subjects received the payoff information in matrix form. Appendix C contains the payoff
matrices of x- and y-types for all treatment conditions. The payoff matrix shows the real and the
nominal payoff, respectively, for each feasible integer combination of (Pi, iP−− ). To inform
subjects about the payoffs of the other type, each subject also received the payoff matrix of the
other type. This information condition was common knowledge. The presentation of payoffs in
the form of a matrix made it particularly easy to find the best reply for any given iP−− : The subject
just had to look for the highest real or nominal payoff in the column associated with iP−− .
12 In
fact, one of the first things most subjects did, after we distributed the instructions, was to mark
the best replies in the payoff tables.
In the treatments with computerized opponents, subjects received the same instructions
and payoff tables as in the treatments with human opponents. In addition, subjects were informed
that the decisions of the other 3 players in the group would be made by pre-programmed
computers. Subjects received an information sheet that informed them about the iP−− -response of
the three computers to each price choice Pi ∈ {1,2, …, 30}. 50 percent of the human subjects in
these conditions were endowed with the payoff function of an x-player, the other 50 percent had
the payoff function of a y-player.
At the end of the final pre-shock period the nominal shock was implemented in the
following way: Subjects were publicly informed that x- and y-types received new payoff tables.
                                                          
11 The detailed meaning attached to the numbers is: 1 = not at all confident; 2 = not much confidence; 3 = not quite
confident; 4 = quite confident; 5 = very confident; 6 = absolutely confident.
12 If a subject is uncertain about the true value of iP−
−  the calculation of the best reply requires, of course, to take
into account the subjective distribution of iP−
−  and not only the expectation of iP−
− . However, for simplicity, in
the following we will use the term “best reply” in the sense of a best reply to the expectation of iP−
− .
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These tables are based on M1 = M0/3. Again each type received the payoff table for his own and
the other type. Subjects kept the pre-shock tables and were encouraged to compare the pre- and
post-shock tables. They were told that, except for payoff tables, everything else would remain
unchanged. They were given enough time to study the new payoff tables and to choose Pi for the
first post-shock period.13 This procedure ensured that in the first post-shock period subjects faced
an exogenous and fully anticipated negative nominal shock. At the beginning of this period it was
also common knowledge that the experiment would last for another T periods.
Before we proceed to the experimental results, it needs to be emphasized that in a given
phase the number of dominated price choices is identical across all treatments. It is, however, not
identical between the pre- and the post-shock phase. Since the money supply is lower in the post-
shock phase the number of dominated strategies is also lower in this phase. Note that the smaller
number of dominated strategies in the post-shock phase is an inevitable result of the fact that the
money supply is reduced while the nominal strategy space and the nominal accounting unit is
kept constant.14 Due to the differences in the number of dominated strategies a comparison of the
adjustment speed across phases must take this difference into account. The higher number of
dominated strategies in the pre-shock phase means, in particular, that the indirect effects of
money illusion are likely to be smaller in this phase. This is so because, if a strategy is dominated,
it is optimal to not play this strategy irrespective of the expectations about other players’
behavior. Thus, expectations about other players’ money illusion necessarily have less impact
and, as a consequence, one would expect a quicker adjustment towards equilibrium in the pre-
shock phase. Note also that the different number of dominated strategies across phases is not a
problem for the main purpose of our research. We are not interested in comparing adjustment
speed across phases but across treatments in the post-shock phase. For our purposes the crucial
point is that in the post-shock phase the number of dominated strategies is identical across
treatments because the only difference in the payoff tables concerns the framing of the payoffs.
                                                          
13 Subjects were told that they had 10 minutes to study the new payoff tables and, in addition, 3 minutes to make a
decision for the first post-shock period. Yet, almost all subjects made their decision well before the 13 minutes had
elapsed. In the second post-shock period subjects were told that they should make a decision approximately within
21/2 minutes, in the third post-shock period within 2 minutes, and so on, until the time limit reached 1 minute.
However, most subjects were far from exhausting these time limits. If, occasionally, a subject used up the whole
decision time the computer told her that she should now make a decision. Subjects could, however, violate the time
limits without any sanction. The decreasing sequence of decision times was introduced because in the pilot
experiments we noticed that subjects needed much less time after the first few periods.
14 A change in the nominal price in the post-shock phase (i. e. at M0/3) by one unit has the same real effects as a
change in the nominal price by three units in the pre-shock phase (i. e. at M0). This means that if a nominal price is
strictly dominated in the post-shock phase there will, in general, be three nominal prices that are strictly dominated
in the pre-shock phase.
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While the framing of the payoffs is irrelevant from a purely game-theoretic viewpoint, it
may well be relevant for subjects’ expectations and behavior. If, for example, some subjects apply
the rule of thumb to take (variations in) the nominal payoff as a proxy for (variations in) the real
payoff, adjustment to equilibrium in the NH may be slower than in the RH. The reason is that
after a negative shock adjustment requires a decrease in nominal prices. By definition, a decrease
in nominal prices is associated with a decrease in nominal payoff numbers in the NH (see, e. g.,
payoff table C3b in appendix C). Therefore, subjects who apply the above rule of thumb
mistakenly believe that real payoffs decrease with lower nominal prices. Thus, they prefer to stay
at higher nominal prices, which may have a direct adjustment reducing effect. Moreover, if some
subjects believe that others apply this rule of thumb, they have an incentive to slow down
adjustment, too. In the RH, however, this rule of thumb cannot become effective because payoffs
are represented in real terms. In the RH, it is, therefore, completely transparent that general price
reductions are not associated with lower real payoffs (see, e.g., payoff table C4b in appendix C).
4. Results
In total, 130 subjects participated in the experiments described in Table 1.15 22 subjects
participated in the real treatment with computerized opponents (RC) and 24 subjects in the
nominal treatment with computerized opponents (NC). 11 groups of four human subjects
participated in the nominal treatment with human opponents (NH) and 10 groups in the real
treatment with human opponents (RH). Subjects were undergraduate students from different
disciplines at the University of Zürich, Switzerland. They were paid a show-up fee of CHF 15
($12) and their total earnings from the experiment were on average CHF 35 ($28) (including the
show-up fee). On average, an experimental session lasted 90 minutes.
4.1. Nominal price adjustment as an individual optimization problem
In this section we address the question whether individual-level money illusion and other
individual-level irrationality contribute to nominal inertia. Therefore, our discussion is
constrained to the RC and the NC where adjustment to the post-shock equilibrium is a purely
individual optimization problem. Our first main result is that in the RC all subjects
instantaneously adjust to the new post-shock equilibrium, i. e., nominal inertia is completely
                                                          
15 In follow-up experiments with a positive money shock, described in detail in section five, another 96 subjects
participated.
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absent. Support for this claim is provided by column 1 of Table 3 and by Figure 1. Both the table
and the figure show the pre- and post-shock path of the average price of all human subjects in the
RC. What is remarkable here is that, except for a few periods, the average price is exactly equal to
the equilibrium price of 0*P
−  = 18 in the pre- and 1*P
−  = 6 in the post-shock period. Moreover, it is
not just the average that coincides with equilibrium. In most periods literally all subjects play the
equilibrium. This result contrasts with what we observe in the nominal frame. In the NC there is a
small amount of nominal inertia since some subjects do not fully adjust prices to the new post-
shock equilibrium. This claim is supported by Table 3 (column 2) and Figure 1. Both the table
and the figure show that the evolution of average prices is, in general, more volatile relative to the
RC. This suggests that at least some subjects in the NC have problems in finding the optimal
solution to their maximization problem. Moreover, while in the RC all subjects instantaneously
adjust their prices fully to the post-shock equilibrium, in the NC only 80 percent of the subjects
do so. The rest of the subjects choose prices above the equilibrium so that in the first post-shock
period the average price is by 2.0 units too high. Throughout the whole post-shock phase the NC
most of the time is close but never exactly in equilibrium which contrasts again with the RC
where after the second post-shock period all subjects are exactly in equilibrium most of the time.
Insert Figure 1 here
Insert Table 3 here
These differences in post-shock adjustment also give rise to differences in the real income
losses across RC and NC. Nominal inertia in the NC causes small but non-negligible real income
losses in the post-shock phase. In contrast, in the RC there are no or only extremely small real
incomes losses in the post-shock phase. To verify this claim we calculate by how much actual real
income of player i, pii, falls short of real income in equilibrium pi*. For this purpose we have
computed εit ≡ (pi* - piit)/pi* for all players in each period t. εit is a measure of the income loss
relative to the equilibrium payoff as a percentage of the equilibrium payoff. Since the equilibrium
is efficient it is also a measure of the efficiency loss. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 present the
evolution of the average value of εit over all players in the RC and in the NC. The two columns
indicate that after the shock the average efficiency loss is most of the time zero in the RC and
always lower than in the NC.
Taken together the results of the treatments with computerized opponents indicate that
there is a small amount of money illusion at the individual level but beyond that there is no
individual irrationality. The small amount of individual-level money illusion is suggested by the
small price differences between the NC and the RC after the shock. The absence of other forms of
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individual irrationality is suggested by the perfect adjustment to the shock and the generally high
incidence of equilibrium play in the RC.
4.2. Nominal price adjustment as a coordination problem
The fact that in the RC the adjustment to the post-shock equilibrium is perfect makes the
interpretation of the deviation of prices from the post-shock equilibrium in the RH particularly
easy. It means that the whole deviation is due to the fact that subjects in the RH face a
coordination problem. The major facts about price adjustment in the RH are displayed in Table 3
and Figure 1. Column 3 of Table 3 shows that in the first post-shock period average prices in the
RH are 3.1 units above the average equilibrium price of 1*P
−  = 6. This deviation quickly decreases
to 1.4 units in period three and after period four the deviation is never larger than one unit. This
pattern of average behavior is not an artifact of aggregation but is also revealed at the level of
individual choices. In the final pre-shock period 93 percent of the subjects in the RH play exactly
their equilibrium strategies. In the first post-shock period only 35 percent of the subjects play the
new equilibrium and 23 percent of the subjects are only one or two price units above the
equilibrium. The other 42 percent are more than two units above the equilibrium. Yet, after only
three periods the distribution of individual price choices has moved much closer to the
equilibrium. In period four 45 percent of all subjects play exactly the equilibrium, 48 percent are
one or two units above and only 7 percent are more than two units above the equilibrium. This
post-shock evolution of prices indicates that the coordination problem initially causes
considerable nominal inertia but that after a few periods this effect is rather small because prices
are again close to the equilibrium.
Our description of the pattern of nominal inertia in the RH is also supported by formal
statistical tests. To check how long average group prices in the RH and the NH deviate
significantly from the equilibrium we ran the following regression for the post-shock phase:
(3) itP
−  - 1*P
−  = )d t1(td tt
20
1t
19
1t
−+
==
βα
where itP
−  denotes the average price of group i in period t. dt = 1 if the price observation in period
t comes from the RH. The coefficients αt measure the deviation from equilibrium in the RH while
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the coefficients βt measure the deviation in the NH.16 The results of regression (3) are
summarized in Table 4. The table shows that, at the five percent level, average prices in the RH
deviate significantly from the equilibrium for two periods. Yet, from period three onwards, the
hypothesis that average prices are in equilibrium can no longer be rejected.
Insert Table 4 here
To what extent is nominal inertia in the RH associated with real income losses? Column 7
of Table 3 indicates that in the first post-shock period the real income loss resulting from
disequilibrium is quite considerable (52 percent). Yet, due to the relatively quick adjustment of
nominal prices after this period the real income loss declines substantially and after the fifth post-
shock period it is – except for period ten – always below ten percent. In the final periods the real
income loss is always rather small which reflects the high incidence of equilibrium play.
The key difference between the RC and the RH is the presence of a coordination problem
in the RH. If subjects perceive coordination as a difficult problem this should be reflected in
subjects’ confidence in eiP−− . In the first few pre-shock periods subjects’ average confidence is at a
level of 4 which means that they are, on average “quite confident”. The high frequency of
equilibrium play before the shock then causes a general increase in the confidence level. In the
last five pre-shock periods subjects exhibit, on average, a confidence level between 5 and 5.5.
This means that most subjects are “very confident” (= level 5) or even “absolutely confident” (=
level 6) that they have correct expectations. The anticipated negative money shock causes,
however, a considerable decrease in subjects’ confidence. In the first post-shock period subjects
on average confidence are “not quite confident” (level 3) and “quite confident” (level 4) that their
expectations will be correct. It takes about eight periods until pre-shock confidence levels are
again established. This indicates that the money shock indeed causes a coordination problem for
the subjects.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the introduction of a coordination problem in
the real treatment causes initially a non-negligible amount of nominal inertia that is associated
with considerable real effects. Yet, nominal inertia vanishes relatively quickly so that already
after a few periods prices are quite close to the equilibrium.
                                                          
16 To prevent linear dependence among the set of regressors we included no dummy variable for period 20 of the RH.
We also ran a regression where we added a constant to (3) so that all deviations are measured relative to the small
deviation in period 20 of the RH. The results of this regression are very similar.
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4.3. Coordination in the presence of money illusion
Nominal inertia in the RH has nothing to do with money illusion but is caused by the
problem to coordinate expectations and actions on the new equilibrium. From the comparison
between the RC and the NC we already know that individual-level money illusion has a small
positive effect on nominal inertia. In the NH a small amount of individual-level money illusion
may, however, cause important indirect effects. These indirect effects can arise because the
presence of individual-level money illusion is likely to affect subjects’ expectations, which in turn
affect their behavior. If money illusion indeed causes such indirect effects we should observe that
the introduction of the nominal frame has a larger effect in the setting with human players than in
the setting with computerized players. We should, in addition, also observe that in the setting
with human players the nominal frame gives rise to an increase in the stickiness of subjects’ price
expectations.
Figure 1 and Table 3 (columns 3 and 4) provide the relevant information regarding the
impact of the nominal frame. They show that nominal prices are indeed much stickier in the NH
compared to the RH. In the final pre-shock period the overwhelming majority of the subjects play
exactly the equilibrium both in the RH (93 percent) and the NH (80 percent). Therefore, average
prices are very close to the pre-shock equilibrium 0*P
−  = 18. In the first post-shock period,
however, only 11.5 percent of all subjects in the NH play exactly the equilibrium and 73 percent
of the subjects are three or more price units above the equilibrium. In contrast, in the RH 35
percent play exactly the equilibrium and, in addition, 23 percent are only two or less price units
above the new equilibrium. These treatment differences in individual adjustment behavior also
give rise to large differences in the average price level. In the first post-shock period the average
price in the NH is 7.1 units above the equilibrium while in the RH the deviation is only 3.1 units
(see Table 3). It takes eight periods in the NH until the deviation of average prices from
equilibrium decreases to 3.1 units. These large differences in price adjustment speed are also
confirmed by formal statistical tests. Table 4 reveals that in the NH the hypothesis of equilibrium
play can be rejected at the five percent level for the first twelve post-shock periods while in the
RH it can only be rejected for two periods.
To what extent is nominal inertia in the NH associated with real income losses? Column 8
of Table 3 indicates that shortly before the shock subjects in the NH achieve almost full
efficiency. The monetary shock leads, however, to a substantial real income loss. In the first
period after the shock the average income loss is 65 percent and during the first ten post-shock
periods the loss is never below 9.5 percent. Note also that throughout the whole post-shock period
20
the income loss is in general much higher in the NH than in the RH which is a consequence of the
much stickier prices in the NH. For example, in the first ten post-shock periods of the NH the
aggregate real income loss is roughly twice as large as the loss in the RH.17 Thus, the evidence
clearly indicates two results: (i) In the setting with human players the introduction of a nominal
frame has large and long-lasting effects on price stickiness. (ii) This increase in price stickiness is
associated with a considerable increase in the real income loss caused by the anticipated money
shock.
From Figure 1 and Table 3 we can also infer that the nominal frame causes much stickier
prices when money illusion can have indirect effects, i. e., in the setting with human players.
Throughout the first ten post-shock periods the adjustment difference in average prices between
the NH and the RH is between 2 and 13 times larger than the adjustment difference between the
NC and the RC. In the second post-shock period, e. g., the adjustment difference between the NH
and the RH is 12.9 – 7.7 = 5.2 price units while the difference between the NC and the RC is only
7.4 – 7.0 = 0.4 units. Hence, in this period the impact of the nominal frame is 13 times larger in
the setting with human players compared to the setting with computerized players. In the tenth
post-shock period the adjustment difference is still 1.8 units in the setting with human players and
only 0.5 units in the setting with computerized players. Thus, the implementation of the nominal
frame has a much larger impact in the setting where money illusion can also have indirect effects.
If money illusion has indirect effects we should also observe that expectations are stickier
in the NH compared to the RH. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the average price expectations
over time in both treatments. The figure shows that in the last few pre-shock periods expectations
are in equilibrium in both treatments. In the post-shock phase there are, however, striking
differences. While expectations are very sticky in the NH they are far less sticky in the RH. Thus,
there can be little doubt that the nominal frame causes a large increase in the stickiness of price
expectations. The next question then is, to what extent this difference in expectations causes
differences in subjects’ price choices. Or put differently, to what extent did subjects play a best
reply to their expectations. The vast majority of subjects in both treatments indeed played best
replies to eiP−− . During the first ten post-shock periods, e.g., 84 percent of the subjects in the RH
choose exactly the payoff-maximizing price in response to eiP−−  and the rest of the subjects
chooses prices that were very close to the best reply. In the NH there are slightly fewer subjects
(80 percent ) who chose exact best replies during the first ten post-shock periods. Yet, as in the
RH the deviations from the exact best reply where in general very small. The fact that most
                                                          
17 To be precise: In total, groups in the NH lose 26% of the potential payoff in the first ten post-shock periods. In the
RH, the respective losses are slightly less than 14 percent.
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subjects responded to eiP−−  with a payoff-maximizing price choice suggests that the greater
stickiness of the expectations in the NH also caused a greater stickiness of actual prices in the
NH.
5. Nominal Inertia after a positive money shock
5.1. The relevance of a positive money shock
Our results so far indicate that the direct effects of individual-level money illusion are
relatively small. The introduction of the nominal frame in the setting with computerized players
leads only to a small increase in nominal inertia. Nominal inertia is much more pronounced,
however, when money illusion can also affect players’ expectations and can, thus, also have
indirect effects. In the NH subjects’ expectations are much stickier and, as a consequence, prices
are much stickier. This raises the question of why expectations are so sticky in the NH compared
to the RH. We believe that the answer to this question can be found in the existence of subjects
who take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs. Subjects who apply this rule of thumb
mistakenly believe that if all players choose relatively high prices, all will reap high real payoffs
because they all reap high nominal payoffs. They mistakenly believe that there are real gains from
jointly setting high prices. Such subjects will, therefore, be reluctant to cut their nominal prices
after the negative money shock in the NH. Moreover, if the presence of subjects who are reluctant
to cut prices is anticipated by other subjects, others will be induced to cut their price
insufficiently, also.
It is important to note that the above rule of thumb cannot become effective in the RH. In
the RH the numbers in the payoff tables represent real payoffs which makes it completely
transparent that at high nominal prices real payoffs are not generally higher. This means that the
presence of subjects who take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs causes no reluctance to
cut nominal prices after the negative shock in the RH. These differences between the NH and the
RH in the reluctance to cut nominal prices also provide a rationale for the much stickier price
expectations in the NH.
Yet, if the above explanation for the stickier expectations in the NH is correct, we should
also observe that after a positive money shock prices and expectations adjust more quickly to the
equilibrium than after a negative shock. This is so because after a positive shock adjustment
towards equilibrium means adjustment towards higher prices and, hence, higher nominal payoffs.
Note, however, that while we should observe a quicker adjustment to equilibrium after a positive
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shock in the NH, the adjustment speed in the RH should not differ across positive and negative
shocks. The reason is again that the rule of thumb cannot become operative in the RH.
To test these implications of our explanation for the much stickier expectations in the NH
we conducted additional experiments with a positive money shock. 48 subjects (12 groups)
participated in the RH and another 48 subjects (12 groups) participated in the NH with the
positive money shock. The easiest way to implement a positive shock would be a reversal in the
sequence of the money supply in our previous design. Unfortunately, this approach is not
reasonable because the number of strictly dominated strategies is much larger in the pre-shock
phase than in the post-shock phase. Therefore, the indirect effects of money illusion can play a
much smaller role in the pre-shock phase. The fact that prices in the NH adjust much more
quickly to the equilibrium in the pre-shock phase than in the post-shock phase (see Figure 1) is
consistent with this argument. Therefore, if we just reversed the sequence of the money supply,
we would probably observe that adjustment is indeed quicker after the positive shock. Yet, this
increase in the adjustment speed would not count as evidence for our explanation of the stickier
expectations in the NH.
What is, therefore, needed, is an experimental design in which the number of dominated
strategies is roughly the same after the negative and after the positive shock. Our
parameterization of the design with the positive shock serves this purpose. Except for three
aspects, all experimental details in the positive-shock design are identical to the negative-shock
design. In particular, all six features of the payoff functions, as described in section 3.2., are also
present in the positive-shock design. The differences are the following: (i) We did not implement
computerized players in the positive-shock design because the main purpose of this design was to
observe whether the expectations of human players and, hence, also prices adjust more quickly to
the equilibrium after a positive shock compared to the negative shock. (ii) In the positive-shock
design the pre- and the post-shock phase consisted of 15 instead of 20 periods. This shortening of
the phases was implemented because in the negative-shock design reliable equilibration was
already achieved after 10-15 periods. (iii) To achieve roughly the same number of dominated
strategies in the post-shock phase, equilibrium prices for x- and y-types in the positive-shock
design were as follows: The pre-shock equilibrium price for x-types (y-types) is *Px  = 11 ( *Py  =
14) and the post-shock equilibrium price is *Px  = 22 ( *Py  = 28). As a consequence, the average
pre-shock equilibrium price in a group is 0*P
− = 12.5 while in the post-shock equilibrium it is 1*P
−
= 25. Thus, the difference in average prices between pre- and post-shock equilibrium is 12.5 in
the positive-shock design while it is 12 in the negative shock design. This slightly bigger
adjustment requirement in the positive shock design is, however, not a problem. If adjustment to
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equilibrium in the NH is faster after the positive shock, this is even more remarkable because it
occurs despite the slightly bigger adjustment requirement in the positive shock design.
5.2. Prices and expectations after the positive nominal shock
Table 5 shows the evolution of pre- and post-shock average prices in the RH and the NH.
In the NH pre-shock prices converge from above to the equilibrium 0*P
−  = 12.5 and as in the
negative shock design the vast majority of individuals plays exactly the equilibrium in the final
pre-shock period. Then, in the first post-shock period prices make a big jump upwards to 20.5 and
already in period four after the shock average prices are almost exactly at the new equilibrium of
1*P
−  = 25. From that period onwards prices remain very close to the equilibrium. This contrasts
sharply with the adjustment process after the negative shock where, throughout the whole post-
shock period, average prices never came so close to the equilibrium. This difference in NH-
adjustment paths after the negative and the positive shock is depicted in Figure 3. The heavy line
in Figure 3 shows the difference in the post-shock deviations of average prices from the
equilibrium between the positive and the negative shock.18 The graph reveals to what extent in
the NH the adjustment gap, i.e., the deviation of average prices from the equilibrium, is larger
after the negative shock than after the positive shock. It shows that the deviation from equilibrium
is substantially larger after the negative shock. Between period two and seven, e. g., the
adjustment gap is four or more units bigger after the negative shock. Even in period ten the
adjustment gap is still almost 3 units bigger.
Insert Table 5 here
Insert Figure 3 here
The impression conveyed by Figure 3 is confirmed by a more formal statistical analysis. If
we perform regression (3) with the data after the positive shock, it turns out that in the NH the
hypothesis of equilibrium play can only be rejected for the first three periods (at the five percent
level). Remember that after the negative shock group prices were significantly above the
equilibrium for twelve periods. Thus, the evidence unambiguously indicates that adjustment in the
NH is much quicker after the positive shock, which is consistent with our hypothesis that there is
less reluctance against adjustment after the positive shock.
                                                          
18 Let ( +
−
1*P - +
−P ) be the deviation of average prices from equilibrium in the positive-shock design and (
−
−P - 
−
−
1*P )
the deviation in the negative-shock design. Then the heavy line in Figure 3 measures (
−
−P  - 
−
−
1*P ) – ( +
−
1*P  - +
−P ) for
the first 15 periods of the post-shock phase in the NH.
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If there is indeed less reluctance against adjustment after the positive shock, at least some
subjects should anticipate this. Therefore we should also observe that expectations are less sticky
after the positive shock. The dashed heavy line in Figure 3 shows the differences in the average
expectations about iP−−  across shocks in the NH. Since this graph is constructed analogously to
the previous graph it shows to what extent the adjustment gap in the expectations, i.e., the
deviation of average expectations from equilibrium, is larger after the negative shock than after
the positive one. The graph indicates that the adjustment gap in the expectations is much larger
after the negative shock for many time periods. Interestingly, the graph is hump-shaped, i.e., the
relative stickiness of expectations after the negative shock increases in the first few periods. This
is due to the fact that between period two and five after the positive shock expectations rapidly
converge to equilibrium while they are very sticky after the negative shock.
Finally, since the rule of thumb of taking nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs
cannot be operative in the RH, we should observe no differences in price adjustment in the RH
across negative and positive shocks. Table 5 shows the evolution of average prices in the RH
after the positive shock and Figure 3 illustrates the differences in average prices and average
expectations across shocks. Table 5 indicates that in the pre-shock phase of the RH the average
price is very close to the equilibrium 0*P
−  = 12.5 already after three periods. Immediately after the
positive shock there is a big upward jump in prices to 22.5, only 2.5 units below the new
equilibrium. Already in the third post-shock period the average price is again very close to the
equilibrium. This indicates that price adjustment after the positive shock is rather quick in the RH
– similar to the pattern after the negative shock. This similarity is also displayed in Figure 3 and
by formal statistical analysis. The thin line in Figure 3 shows that price adjustment in the RH is
only slightly faster after the positive shock. If we perform regression (3) with the post-shock data
from the positive-shock design we get the following results: The hypothesis that average prices in
the RH are in equilibrium can only be rejected for the first two periods (at the five percent level).
Note that this is exactly the same number of out-of-equilibrium periods as after the negative
shock. This suggests that the differences in the price adjustment across shocks in the RH are
indeed negligible. The dashed thin line in Figure 3 indicates that we can basically make a similar
conclusion with regard to the differences in the adjustment of expectations across shocks. While
in the NH there are large differences in the stickiness of expectations across shocks, in the RH the
differences in expectations are rather small.
Thus all major regularities are consistent with our hypothesis that there are beliefs that
some subjects take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs. Nonetheless, it would be
reassuring if subjects themselves expressed such a belief. To check to what extent subjects indeed
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believed this they could indicate their degree of agreement with the following statement after the
experiment: “I believed that the other subjects would interpret high nominal payoffs as an
indicator for high real payoffs”. Participants could indicate whether they weakly (dis)agreed,
whether they strongly (dis)agreed or whether they totally (dis)agreed with this statement. 30
percent of the subjects in the NH agreed either “strongly” or “totally” and further 25 percent
indicated a weak agreement. In our view, this can be taken as direct evidence for the presence of a
belief that other subjects are affected by money illusion. In any case, these answers nicely fit with
our explanation for the large amount of nominal inertia observed in the NH after the negative
shock.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
Most economic transactions are represented in nominal terms. Therefore, it seems likely
that people often perceive and think about economic problems in nominal terms which may
induce money illusion. However, for several decades money illusion has been considered as
largely irrelevant for the nominal inertia of aggregate price levels. Instead, most economists have
focused on informational frictions, costs of price adjustment and staggered contracts. This paper
shows, however, that even in the absence of these factors a fully anticipated negative nominal
shock can cause long-lasting nominal inertia that is associated with large real income losses
during the adjustment phase. Our results indicate that a large part of this nominal inertia can be
attributed to the direct and indirect effects of money illusion. The experiments in the setting with
computerized opponents show that the direct effects of money illusion in the form of individual
optimization mistakes are not very frequent: The introduction of the nominal frame in the setting
with computerized opponents causes only a small amount of nominal inertia. However, the
combined direct and indirect effects of money illusion generate a very large increase in nominal
inertia. This is indicated by the fact that the introduction of the nominal frame in the setting with
human opponents causes a huge increase in the sluggishness of prices. Instead of two it takes
twelve periods until average prices reach the post-shock equilibrium in this setting.
The major cause for nominal inertia after the negative shock is that subjects’ expectations
are very sticky. In our view this stickiness of price expectations is related to the nature of money
illusion in our experiment, i.e., to the belief that there are subjects who take nominal payoffs as a
proxy for real payoffs. This conjecture is supported by direct questionnaire evidence and by the
results of further experiments with a fully anticipated positive nominal shock. It turns out that
price sluggishness is much smaller after a positive nominal shock than after the negative shock.
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This result is also interesting insofar as there is field evidence indicating that positive and
negative money shocks have asymmetric effects. While negative shocks have an output reducing
effect, positive shocks do not seem to affect output (Cover 1992, De Long and Summers 1988).
The asymmetric effects of money illusion on price sluggishness can be considered as a potential
micro-foundation for this result.
Finally, another interesting result of our experiments is that we isolate – in addition to
money illusion - a further source of nominal inertia that has been largely neglected by economists.
This source of nominal inertia is related to the fact that in a strategic situation subjects do not
merely face an individual optimization problem but that they also have to predict other agents’
behavior. After any shock, the new equilibrium can only be achieved if subjects have equilibrium
expectations, i.e., if they have coordinated expectations. The comparison of adjustment paths in
the real treatments with computerized and with human opponents shows that after a fully
anticipated nominal shock, it cannot be taken for granted that subjects instantaneously succeed in
solving this coordination problem. They will, in general, go through a period of disequilibrium
that is associated with nominal inertia. Note, however, that the coordination problem alone causes
substantially less nominal inertia than money illusion. It also does not cause asymmetric effects:
In the real treatment with human opponents the extent of nominal inertia is very similar after the
positive and the negative nominal shock.
In our view the results of our experiments suggest that money illusion should be
considered as a serious candidate in the explanation of nominal inertia and the real effects of
nominal shocks. Paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln19, one can say that, to render money illusion
behaviorally relevant, it is not necessary to fool all the people some of the time, not to speak of
fooling all the people all the time. All that is needed is the presence of a small amount of money
illusion at the individual-level – a presupposition that seems quite plausible.
                                                          
19In his speech on 8 Sept. 1858 A. Lincoln said: “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the
people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.“
27
References
Abbott, M. and Ashenfelter, O. (1976): Labor Supply, Commodity Demand and the Allocation of
Time. Review of Economic Studies, 43(3): 389-411.
Akerlof, G.A. and Yellen, J.L. (1985): A Near Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage
and Price Inertia. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100: 823-38.
Akerlof, G.A.; Dickens, W.T. and Perry, G.L. (1996): The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1): 1-76.
Ball, L. and Romer, D. (1987): Sticky Prices as a Coordination Failure. New York University.
Mimeo.
Belongia, M.T. (1996): Measurement Matters: Recent Results from Monetary Economics
Reexamined. Journal of Political Economy, 104(5): 1065-83.
Bernanke, B.S. and Carey, K. (1996): Nominal Wage Stickiness and Aggregate Supply in the
Great Depression. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 853-84.
Bewley T. F. (1998): Why Not Cut Pay?. European Economic Review; 42(3-5), 459-490.
Blanchard, O.J. (1990): Why does Money affect Output? A Survey. In: B.M. Friedman and F.M.
Hahn (eds.): Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol. 2, North-Holland: Amsterdam: 779-
835.
Blanchard, O.J. and Kiyotaki, N. (1987): Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate
Demand. American Economic Review, 77(4): 647-66.
Blinder, A. S. and Choi, D. H. (1990): A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105: 1003-1016.
Blinder, A. S., E. D. Canetti, D. E. Lebow, and J. B. Rudd (1998): Asking about Prices – A New
Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness, Russel Sage Foundation, New York.
Bryant, J. (1983): A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 98(Aug.): 525-8.
Card, D. and Hyslop D. (1998): Does Inflation ‘Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market’? in: C.D.
Romer and D.H. Romer (eds.): Reducing Inflation. Motivation and Strategy. University of
Chicago Press.
Coleman, W.J. (1996): Money and Output: A Test of Reverse Causation. American Economic
Review, 86(1): 90-111.
Cooper, R.W. and Haltiwanger, J. (1993): Evidence on Macroeconomic Complementarities.
NBER Working Paper no. 4577.
Cover, J. P. (1992): Asymmetric Effects of Positive and Negative Money-Supply Shocks.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 1261-1282.
De Long, J. B. and Lawrence Summers (1988): How does Macroeconomic Policy affect Output?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 433-480.
Diamond, P.A. (1982): Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium. Journal of
Political Economy, 90(Oct.): 881-94.
Fischer, S. (1977): Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply
Rule. Journal of Political Economy, 85 (1): 191-205.
Fisher, I. (1928): The Money Illusion. Longmans: Toronto.
Friedman, B.M. and Hahn, F.M. (1990): Handbook of Monetary Economics. Vol. 2, North-
Holland: Amsterdam.
Haltiwanger, J. and Waldman, M. (1985): Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality:
An Analysis of Heterogeneity. American Economic Review, 75(3): 326-40.
Haltiwanger, J. and Waldman, M. (1989): Rational Expectations and Strategic Complements: The
Implications for Macroeconomics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (August): 463-84.
28
Hoover, K.D. and Perez, S.J. (1994): Post hoc ergo propter hoc once more: An evaluation of
‘Does Money Matter?’ in the spirit of James Tobin. Journal of Monetary Economics, 34: 75-
88.
Howitt, P. (1989): Money Illusion. In: J Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.): Money. W.
W. Norton: New York, London: 244-247.
Kahn, S. (1997): Evidence of Nominal Wage Stickiness. American Economic Review, 88(5): 993-
1008.
Leontief, W. (1936): The Fundamental Assumptions of Mr. Keynes’ Monetary Theory of
Unemployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 5(Nov.): 192-197.
Lucas, R.E. Jr. (1972): Expectations and the Neutrality of Money. Journal of Economic Theory,
4(April): 103-24.
Mankiw, N.G. (1985): Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model
of Monopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(May): 529-537.
Mankiw, N.G. and Romer, D.H. (eds.) (1991): New Keynesian Economics. Vol. 1 & Vol. 2, MIT
Press: Cambridge, MA.
Niemi B. and Lloyd B. (1981): Female Labor Supply in the Context of Inflation. American
Economic Review, 71(2): 70-75.
Oh, S. and Waldman, M. (1990): The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements.
Quarterly Journal of Economics,105(5): 1018-33.
Oh, S. and Waldman, M. (1994): Strategic Complementarity Slows Macroeconomic Adjustment
to Temporary Shocks. Economic Inquiry, 32(April): 318-29.
Patinkin, D. (1949): The Indeterminacy of Absolute Prices in Classical Economic Theory.
Econometrica 17(1): 1-27.
Romer, C.D. and Romer, D.H. (1989): Does monetary policy matter? A new test in the Spirit of
Friedman and Schwartz. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 4 : 121.
Romer, C.D. and Romer, D.H. (1994): Monetary Policy Matters. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 34: 75-88.
Russell, T. and Thaler, R.H. (1985) The Relevance of Quasi-Rationality in Competitive Markets.
American Economic Review, 75(5): 1071-82.
Selten, R. and Berg, C.C. (1970): Drei experimentelle Oligopolserien mit kontinuierlichem
Zeitablauf, in: H. Sauermann (ed.): Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol.
II, Tübingen: 162-221.
Shafir, E.; Diamond, P.A. and Tversky, A. (1997): On Money Illusion. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112(May): 341-74.
Taylor, J.B. (1979): Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model. American Economic Review,
69(2): 108-113.
Tobin, J. (1972): Inflation and Unemployment. American Economic Review, 62: 1-18.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1981): The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.
Science 211: 453-8.
Appendices 1
Appendices
Appendix A Functional specification of payoffs
Appendix B Instructions for experimental subjects
Appendix C Payoff Tables for negative shock
Appendix D Payoff Tables for positive shock
Appendix E Response Rule for computerized agents
Appendix F Tables and Figures
Appendices 2
Appendix A – Functional specification of payoffs
As explained in detail in section 3.2 our specification of subjects’ payoff functions served
several purposes. A particularly important purpose was to rule out that the adjustment to the
equilibrium is confounded by subjects’ attempts to achieve real payoff gains by non-
equilibrium behavior. Note that this purpose rules out payoff functions that are derived from
oligopolistic or monopolistic competition among firms. We achieved our aim by the payoff
functions below because they imply that the equilibrium is the only efficient point in payoff
space.
Note also that the equilibrium price for each individual i is a best reply not only to the
equilibrium expectation for iP−−  but also to out-of-equilibrium expectations that are close to
the equilibrium expectation (see also payoff tables in Appendix C and D below). This feature
of the payoff functions speeds up adjustment to equilibrium because it ensures that the
equilibrium price choice is also a best reply for expectations that are not exactly in
equilibrium. The arctan-function in the denominator reflects this property of the payoff
functions.
The real payoff for agent i of type k = x, y is given by:
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Appendix B Instructions
The original instructions were in German. This section reprints a translation of the
instructions used in the Nominal treatment with human opponents for agents of type y.
General instructions for participants
You are participating in a scientific experiment which is funded by the Swiss National
Science Foundation. The purpose of this experiment is to analyze decision making in
experimental markets. If you read instructions carefully and take appropriate decisions, you
may earn a considerable amount of money. At the end of the experiment all the money you
earned will be immediately paid out in cash.
Each participant is paid SFr.15.- for showing up. During the experiment your income will
not be calculated in Swiss Francs but in points. The total amount of points you collected
during the experiment will be converted into Swiss Francs, by applying the following
exchange rate:
10 Points = 15 centimes.
Here is a brief description of the experiment. A more detailed description is given
below. All participants are in the role of firms, selling some product. In this experiment,
there are two types of firms: firms of type x and firms of type y. Each firm has to choose a
selling price in every period. The income you earn depends on the price you choose and on the
prices all other firms choose.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant.
If you have any questions, the experimenters will be glad to answer them. If you do not
follow these instructions you will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all
payments.
The following pages describe the procedures of the experiment in detail.
Detailed information for firms of type y
This experiment lasts 20 periods plus one trial period. You are not paid for the trial period.
You should nevertheless take the trial period seriously since you may gain experience in this
period. This experience helps you to take decisions in the other periods which are paid out.
You are in the role of a firm, just as all other participants in this experiment. All participants
are in groups of 4, i.e. every participant is in a group with three other firms. There are two
firms of type x and two firms of type y in every group.
You are a firm of type y
Consequently, there are two other firms of type x and one more firm of type y in your
group. No participant knows which persons are in his or her group. Yet, everybody knows that
the group composition remains constant throughout the experiment. The decisions taken by
other groups are irrelevant for your group.
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In every period all firms simultaneously decide which selling price they set for the current
period. Every firm has to choose an integer price from the interval 1 ≤  selling price ≤  30.
How much you earn depends on the price you choose and on the average price of all other
firms in your group. Independent of the type, the average price for every firm is calculated by
the following formula:
Average price = (Sum of selling prices of other 3 firms) / 3
Consequently, the average price will be in the interval 1 ≤  selling price ≤  30.
The average price is rounded to the next integer number.
How to read the income table for a firm of type y
The green income table shows your nominal income in points if you choose a specific
price and a specific average price results in this period (see separate table). Your income at the
end of the experiment is not based on nominal point income, but on real point income. The
following relation between the two holds:
Real income = Nominal income / Average price of other firms
This formula holds for all firms. The real point income that will be paid out is rounded in
every period to the next integer number.
Example:
Suppose, you choose a price of 2 and the actual average price is 4. In this case your nominal point income is 29
points. Your (rounded) real income is 7 points (= 29 / 4).
When you decide which price to choose, you do not yet know which average price will
actually result in this period. The green income table can consequently help you to calculate
your real point income given your expectation on the average price of other firms.
Example:
Given an expectation on the average price you can read off the green table the payoff you get when choosing dif-
ferent selling prices. For example, if you expect an average price of 30 and choose a price of 17, your expected
nominal income is 141 points, your expected real income is 5 points (= 141 / 30). If you choose a price of 10 at
this expected price, your expected nominal income is 86 points, your expected real income 3 points (= 86 / 30).
Please note that you are in a group with one firm of type y and two firms of type x. To
determine the income of the other firm of type y, you have to use the green table. To
determine the income of the other two firms of type x, you have to use the blue income table.
This table also shows nominal income in points. The same formula above is used to calculate
real payoffs for firms of type x.
What the screens show
On both screens described below the current period is indicated in the upper left corner,
and the upper right corner displays remaining time in seconds to decide or to view the screen.
The upper half of the input screen (see figure on next page) has three cells, where you can
enter data into the computer.
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Price decision: Enter an integer number between 1 and 30 into the first cell. You can
activate this cell (as well as the other cells) by clicking into the cell with your mouse. If you
want to revise your decision, you can erase the number by hitting the backspace key.
Expected average price: Enter an integer number between 1 and 30 into the second cell.
This input does not affect your income and will not be known to other firms. Your payoff will
be determined by the actual average price of this period. Please try to indicate an expectation
that is as exact as possible since this is going to help you to take your own price decision.
Confidence: Enter an integer number from 1 to 6 to indicate how confident you are that the
average price you expect (= number in the second cell) will actually result.
The numbers stand for:
1 = I am not at all confident that my expectation will be correct
2 = I have not much confidence that my expectation will be correct
3 = I am not quite confident that my expectation will be correct
4 = I am quite confident that my expectation will be correct
5 = I am very confident that my expectation will be correct
6 = I am absolutely confident that my expectation will be correct
When you finished entering the numbers into the respective cells, press the OK-button.
Once you have pressed the button, you cannot revise your decision any more for this period.
Figure B1: Input screen
As soon as all firms have decided on their prices, the outcomes of this period will be
shown in the outcome-screen.
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The upper part of this screen shows the outcomes of the current period. This screen shows
your decision of the current period, the average price, your real income of this period, and
your total real payoff.
The lower part of this screen displays the outcomes of past periods.
Figure B2: Outcome screen
Overview: What you have to do in every period.
In every period every firm has to choose a price. Every integer price from 1 to 30 can
be chosen (1 ≤  selling price ≤  30)
• Enter your price decision into the first cell of the input screen.
• Enter into the second cell the average you expect for this period
(1 ≤  selling price ≤  30)
• Enter your confidence in your price expectation into the third cell (numbers 1 to 6).
When you have completed the three cells, press the OK-Button. The remaining time to
take your decisions is shown in the upper right corner of the screen.
When all participants have taken their decisions, or when the time has elapsed, all
participants are shown the outcome screen. This screen shows your decisions, actual average
prices and your real payoff in points for the current and the past periods.
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To take your decisions the following aids are at your disposition:
Green income table: Helps you to estimate your expected nominal point income (You are
a firm of type y). Your payoff is determined by your real income in points. 
You can calculate your real income from the nominal income (= numbers shown in the
income table) by applying the following formula:
Real income =  Nominal income / Average price of other firms
Blue income table: Helps to estimate the nominal point income of the firms of type x in
your group. The payoff of these firms are also determined by their real point income. To
calculate the real income of firms of type x, you also apply the formula above.
Outcome screen: Displays your selling price, the actual average price and your real
income for the present and the past periods.
Do you have any questions?
Control questions
You have to answer all of the following questions. If you do not answer a question, you
will be excluded from the experiment and all payments. Wrong answers do not have any
consequences. If you have any questions, please ask us.
1. Please indicate an expectation for the average price of other firms from 1 to 30.
Expected average price ............................
2. Please indicate a selling price from 1 to 30.
Selling price ............................
3) What is your expected nominal income in points at the prices you indicated in 1)
and 2)?
Your nominal income ............................
4. What is your expected real income in points at the prices you indicated in 1) and 2)?
Your real income ............................
5. Suppose you choose a price of 1. The other firm of type y chooses a price of 30. The
first firm of type x chooses a price of 7 and the second firm of type x chooses a price of
23.
a) What is your average price at the (fictitious) prices? ............................
What is your nominal income? ............................
What is your real income? ............................
b) What is the average price of the other firm of type y? ............................
What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................
What is the real income of this firm? ............................
c) What is the average price of the first firm of type x? ............................
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What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................
What is the real income of this firm? ............................
d) What is the average price of the second firm of type x? ............................
What is the nominal income of this firm? ............................
What is the real income of this firm? ............................
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Payoff Tables for treatm
ents w
ith negative shock
Payoff table C
1a: N
om
inal, pre-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
18
40
68
102
143
191
243
298
351
397
433
455
464
462
453
439
423
410
403
407
424
441
442
429
409
385
360
336
314
293
2
16
35
60
91
128
172
222
278
335
390
437
473
495
503
500
490
476
463
456
461
480
499
500
486
462
434
405
377
351
326
3
14
31
53
80
113
153
200
254
312
372
429
478
514
535
543
540
530
520
514
520
542
563
565
549
523
491
458
425
394
365
4
12
28
47
71
100
136
178
228
285
346
409
468
518
554
576
585
583
577
574
583
608
632
636
620
591
556
518
480
444
410
5
11
24
42
63
88
120
158
203
256
316
380
445
506
558
596
619
629
632
634
647
675
702
709
695
666
628
586
543
501
462
6
10
22
37
56
78
106
140
180
229
284
347
413
481
544
597
637
663
677
689
707
738
769
781
772
745
707
662
614
567
522
7
9
20
33
49
69
94
123
159
202
253
312
377
446
516
581
636
679
708
731
757
792
826
845
844
825
790
745
694
641
590
8
8
18
30
44
62
83
109
141
179
224
278
339
406
478
550
617
674
720
756
789
827
865
893
905
898
872
831
780
724
668
9
7
16
27
40
55
74
97
125
158
198
246
301
365
435
508
582
650
709
758
800
840
880
918
946
956
945
915
869
814
754
10
7
14
24
36
49
66
86
111
140
175
217
267
325
390
462
536
610
679
738
786
827
868
915
960
991
1002
990
956
906
847
11
6
13
22
32
45
59
77
99
124
155
192
236
287
347
414
486
561
633
698
751
792
832
885
945
998
1034
1046
1032
996
942
12
6
12
20
29
40
53
69
88
111
138
170
209
254
307
368
435
507
579
645
699
738
778
834
903
975
1035
1075
1088
1073
1034
13
5
11
18
27
36
48
62
79
99
123
151
185
225
271
325
386
453
521
586
638
675
711
768
842
925
1006
1072
1115
1129
1113
14
5
10
17
24
33
44
56
71
89
110
134
164
199
240
288
342
402
465
525
574
608
641
695
770
858
950
1038
1109
1155
1170
15
4
9
15
22
30
40
51
64
80
98
120
146
177
213
254
302
355
412
467
512
542
572
622
693
780
877
977
1070
1146
1194
16
4
8
14
20
28
36
46
58
72
89
108
131
157
188
225
267
314
364
413
453
480
507
552
617
700
796
900
1006
1104
1183
17
4
8
13
19
26
33
42
53
65
80
97
117
141
168
200
237
278
322
365
401
424
448
488
547
623
713
815
925
1035
1137
18
3
7
12
17
24
31
39
48
60
73
88
106
126
150
178
210
246
285
323
354
375
396
432
484
551
633
729
836
950
1065
19
3
6
11
16
22
28
36
44
54
66
80
95
114
135
160
188
219
253
286
314
332
351
382
428
487
561
647
747
858
977
20
3
6
10
15
20
26
33
41
50
60
73
87
103
122
143
167
195
225
254
278
295
311
338
378
431
495
573
663
767
882
21
3
6
10
13
19
24
30
38
46
55
66
79
93
110
129
151
175
201
227
248
262
277
301
336
382
438
506
587
680
787
22
3
6
9
13
17
22
28
35
42
51
61
72
85
100
117
136
157
180
203
221
234
247
268
299
339
388
448
518
602
698
23
3
5
9
12
16
20
26
32
39
47
56
66
78
91
106
123
142
162
182
199
210
222
240
267
302
345
397
458
532
617
24
2
5
8
11
15
20
24
30
36
43
51
61
71
83
97
112
129
147
164
179
189
199
216
239
270
307
353
406
470
546
25
2
4
8
11
14
18
23
27
34
40
48
56
66
76
89
102
117
133
148
162
171
180
195
216
242
275
315
361
417
483
26
2
4
7
10
13
17
21
26
31
37
44
52
60
70
81
93
107
121
135
147
155
163
176
195
218
247
282
322
371
428
27
2
4
7
9
13
16
20
24
29
34
41
48
56
65
75
86
98
110
123
133
141
149
160
177
198
223
253
289
331
381
28
2
4
6
9
12
15
19
23
27
32
38
45
52
60
69
79
90
101
112
122
129
136
146
161
179
202
228
260
297
340
29
2
4
6
8
11
14
18
21
26
30
36
41
48
56
64
73
83
93
103
112
118
124
134
147
163
183
207
234
267
305
30
2
4
6
8
11
13
17
20
24
28
33
39
45
52
59
67
76
86
95
103
108
114
123
135
149
167
188
212
241
274
A
ppendices 10
Payoff table C
1b: N
om
inal, pre-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
9
16
22
27
31
34
37
39
41
42
44
45
47
50
53
56
58
59
60
59
59
58
58
57
56
55
54
53
52
51
2
10
18
24
29
34
37
40
42
44
46
47
49
51
53
57
60
63
63
64
63
63
62
61
60
59
58
57
56
55
54
3
11
20
27
33
37
41
44
46
48
50
51
53
55
57
61
65
67
68
68
68
67
66
65
64
63
62
60
59
58
57
4
12
22
30
36
41
44
48
50
52
54
55
57
59
62
66
70
72
73
73
73
72
71
69
68
67
65
64
63
61
60
5
14
24
33
40
45
49
53
55
57
59
60
62
64
67
71
76
78
79
79
78
77
76
74
73
71
70
68
66
65
63
6
16
28
37
45
50
55
58
61
63
64
66
67
69
73
77
82
85
86
85
84
83
81
79
78
76
74
72
70
69
67
7
18
31
42
50
56
61
64
67
69
70
72
73
76
79
84
89
92
93
92
91
89
87
85
83
81
79
77
75
73
71
8
20
36
47
56
63
68
72
74
76
78
79
80
83
86
92
97
101
101
100
99
97
94
92
89
87
84
82
80
78
76
9
23
40
54
64
71
76
80
83
84
86
87
88
91
95
101
107
110
110
109
107
105
102
99
96
93
90
88
85
83
80
10
26
46
61
72
80
86
90
92
94
95
96
97
100
104
111
117
121
121
119
117
114
110
107
104
100
97
94
91
88
86
11
29
51
69
81
90
97
101
103
105
106
107
108
110
115
122
129
133
133
131
128
124
120
116
112
108
104
101
97
94
91
12
32
58
77
92
102
109
114
116
118
118
119
120
122
127
135
143
147
147
144
140
136
131
126
121
117
113
109
105
101
98
13
35
64
87
104
116
123
128
131
132
133
133
134
136
141
150
159
163
162
159
154
149
143
138
132
127
122
117
113
109
104
14
37
70
96
116
130
140
145
148
149
149
149
149
152
157
167
177
181
180
176
170
164
157
150
144
138
132
127
122
117
112
15
39
74
105
129
146
157
164
168
169
168
168
168
170
176
187
198
203
201
196
189
181
173
165
158
151
144
138
132
126
121
16
40
78
113
141
162
176
185
189
191
191
190
189
191
198
210
223
227
225
218
209
201
191
182
173
165
157
150
143
136
130
17
39
79
117
151
177
195
207
213
216
216
214
214
216
223
237
251
256
253
245
235
223
212
201
191
181
172
163
155
148
141
18
37
78
119
157
189
213
229
239
243
244
243
242
244
252
268
283
289
285
275
263
250
236
223
211
199
189
179
170
161
153
19
35
74
117
159
197
227
250
264
272
274
274
274
276
285
303
321
327
322
311
296
280
264
249
234
221
208
196
186
176
167
20
32
69
112
156
199
236
266
287
300
306
308
309
312
323
343
363
370
364
351
334
315
296
278
261
245
230
216
204
192
182
21
29
63
104
149
195
239
277
306
326
337
343
346
351
364
387
409
418
412
397
378
356
334
312
292
273
256
240
225
211
199
22
25
57
95
139
186
234
279
317
346
365
377
385
393
408
434
459
470
465
449
427
403
377
352
328
306
285
266
249
233
219
23
23
50
85
126
173
223
273
319
357
387
407
421
434
453
482
511
524
521
506
483
456
426
397
369
343
319
297
276
258
241
24
20
45
76
113
158
206
259
311
358
398
429
452
471
495
527
559
578
579
566
544
515
483
450
417
387
358
332
308
287
267
25
18
40
67
101
142
188
240
295
349
398
439
472
500
530
565
601
625
633
627
608
579
545
509
472
437
403
373
345
320
297
26
16
35
60
89
126
169
219
273
330
386
436
480
517
552
591
629
660
679
682
671
646
613
574
534
494
456
420
387
358
331
27
14
31
53
79
112
151
196
248
305
364
421
473
519
560
600
640
678
709
727
727
712
683
645
603
559
516
475
437
402
370
28
12
28
47
70
99
134
175
223
277
335
395
452
505
550
591
631
676
720
753
771
770
751
719
677
631
583
537
493
453
416
29
11
24
41
62
87
118
155
198
248
304
363
422
478
526
565
605
654
708
758
795
814
811
790
754
708
658
607
558
512
469
30
10
22
37
55
77
104
137
175
221
272
328
386
442
490
527
565
616
677
741
796
836
855
851
827
788
739
686
631
579
530
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Payoff table C
2a: R
eal, pre-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
18
20
23
26
29
32
35
37
39
40
39
38
36
33
30
27
25
23
21
20
20
20
19
18
16
15
13
12
11
10
2
16
18
20
23
26
29
32
35
37
39
40
39
38
36
33
31
28
26
24
23
23
23
22
20
18
17
15
13
12
11
3
14
16
18
20
23
26
29
32
35
37
39
40
40
38
36
34
31
29
27
26
26
26
25
23
21
19
17
15
14
12
4
12
14
16
18
20
23
25
29
32
35
37
39
40
40
38
37
34
32
30
29
29
29
28
26
24
21
19
17
15
14
5
11
12
14
16
18
20
23
25
28
32
35
37
39
40
40
39
37
35
33
32
32
32
31
29
27
24
22
19
17
15
6
10
11
12
14
16
18
20
23
25
28
32
34
37
39
40
40
39
38
36
35
35
35
34
32
30
27
25
22
20
17
7
9
10
11
12
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
37
39
40
40
39
38
38
38
38
37
35
33
30
28
25
22
20
8
8
9
10
11
12
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
37
39
40
40
40
39
39
39
39
38
36
34
31
28
25
22
9
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
36
38
39
40
40
40
40
40
39
38
36
34
31
28
25
10
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
36
38
39
39
39
39
40
40
40
39
37
34
31
28
11
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
16
17
20
22
25
28
30
33
35
37
38
38
38
38
39
40
40
39
37
34
31
12
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
17
20
22
25
27
30
32
34
35
35
35
36
38
39
40
40
39
37
34
13
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
17
19
22
24
27
29
31
32
32
32
33
35
37
39
40
40
39
37
14
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
17
19
21
24
26
28
29
29
29
30
32
34
37
38
40
40
39
15
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
17
19
21
23
25
26
26
26
27
29
31
34
36
38
40
40
16
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
17
18
20
22
23
23
23
24
26
28
31
33
36
38
39
17
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
18
19
20
20
20
21
23
25
27
30
33
36
38
18
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
18
18
19
20
22
24
27
30
33
36
19
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
16
17
18
19
22
24
27
30
33
20
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
10
10
11
13
13
14
14
14
15
16
17
19
21
24
26
29
21
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
9
10
11
12
12
12
13
13
14
15
17
19
21
23
26
22
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
9
10
11
11
11
11
12
12
14
15
17
19
21
23
23
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
11
12
13
15
16
18
21
24
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
18
25
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
26
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
9
10
10
12
13
14
27
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
9
9
10
11
13
28
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
10
11
29
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
10
30
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
8
8
9
A
ppendices 12
Payoff table C
2b: R
eal, pre-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
4
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
5
14
12
11
10
9
8
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
6
16
14
12
11
10
9
8
8
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
7
18
16
14
13
11
10
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
8
20
18
16
14
13
11
10
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
9
23
20
18
16
14
13
11
10
9
9
8
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
10
26
23
20
18
16
14
13
12
10
10
9
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
11
29
26
23
20
18
16
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
12
32
29
26
23
20
18
16
15
13
12
11
10
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
13
35
32
29
26
23
21
18
16
15
13
12
11
10
10
10
10
10
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
14
37
35
32
29
26
23
21
19
17
15
14
12
12
11
11
11
11
10
9
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
15
39
37
35
32
29
26
23
21
19
17
15
14
13
13
12
12
12
11
10
9
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
16
40
39
38
35
32
29
26
24
21
19
17
16
15
14
14
14
13
13
11
10
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
17
39
40
39
38
35
33
30
27
24
22
19
18
17
16
16
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
18
37
39
40
39
38
36
33
30
27
24
22
20
19
18
18
18
17
16
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
19
35
37
39
40
39
38
36
33
30
27
25
23
21
20
20
20
19
18
16
15
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
6
20
32
35
37
39
40
39
38
36
33
31
28
26
24
23
23
23
22
20
18
17
15
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
6
21
29
32
35
37
39
40
40
38
36
34
31
29
27
26
26
26
25
23
21
19
17
15
14
12
11
10
9
8
7
7
22
25
29
32
35
37
39
40
40
38
37
34
32
30
29
29
29
28
26
24
21
19
17
15
14
12
11
10
9
8
7
23
23
25
28
32
35
37
39
40
40
39
37
35
33
32
32
32
31
29
27
24
22
19
17
15
14
12
11
10
9
8
24
20
23
25
28
32
34
37
39
40
40
39
38
36
35
35
35
34
32
30
27
25
22
20
17
15
14
12
11
10
9
25
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
37
39
40
40
39
38
38
38
38
37
35
33
30
28
25
22
20
17
16
14
12
11
10
26
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
37
39
40
40
40
39
39
39
39
38
36
34
31
28
25
22
20
18
16
14
12
11
27
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
36
38
39
40
40
40
40
40
39
38
36
34
31
28
25
22
20
18
16
14
12
28
12
14
16
18
20
22
25
28
31
34
36
38
39
39
39
39
40
40
40
39
37
34
31
28
25
22
20
18
16
14
29
11
12
14
16
17
20
22
25
28
30
33
35
37
38
38
38
38
39
40
40
39
37
34
31
28
25
22
20
18
16
30
10
11
12
14
15
17
20
22
25
27
30
32
34
35
35
35
36
38
39
40
40
39
37
34
32
28
25
23
20
18
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Payoff table C
3a: N
om
inal, post-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
18
51
104
159
181
173
181
183
153
122
98
80
66
56
48
42
37
33
30
27
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
13
2
12
35
76
137
199
226
246
257
221
174
135
107
86
71
60
51
45
39
35
31
28
26
24
22
20
19
18
17
16
14
3
9
24
53
100
169
236
280
315
305
251
193
148
116
93
76
64
54
47
41
37
33
30
27
25
23
21
19
18
17
16
4
7
18
37
69
123
193
246
301
358
344
279
212
161
124
99
81
67
57
49
43
38
34
31
28
26
23
22
20
19
18
5
5
13
27
49
85
137
181
231
326
398
382
306
230
173
133
105
85
71
60
52
45
40
35
32
29
26
24
22
21
19
6
4
10
20
35
59
95
125
161
243
355
437
417
332
247
185
141
111
90
74
63
54
47
41
37
33
30
27
25
23
21
7
3
8
15
26
43
67
87
112
169
262
386
474
451
356
264
196
149
117
94
78
66
56
49
43
38
34
31
28
26
24
8
3
6
12
20
32
49
63
80
118
182
284
417
511
485
381
281
208
157
123
99
81
68
58
51
45
40
35
32
29
27
9
2
5
10
16
25
37
47
59
84
127
196
305
447
548
518
405
297
219
165
129
103
85
71
61
53
46
41
37
33
30
10
2
4
8
13
20
29
36
45
63
91
137
212
328
478
583
550
429
313
230
173
135
108
88
74
63
54
48
42
38
34
11
2
4
7
11
16
23
29
35
48
68
99
148
227
349
508
619
581
452
329
241
181
140
112
92
77
65
56
49
44
39
12
1
3
6
9
13
18
23
28
38
52
74
107
159
242
371
538
653
612
475
345
251
188
146
116
95
79
67
58
51
44
13
1
2
5
8
11
15
19
23
30
41
57
80
114
169
257
393
567
687
643
497
360
262
196
151
120
98
82
69
60
52
14
1
2
4
7
9
13
16
19
25
33
45
61
85
122
180
272
414
596
721
673
519
375
273
203
157
125
102
85
72
62
15
1
2
4
5
8
11
13
16
21
27
36
48
66
91
130
190
286
435
625
754
703
541
390
283
211
163
129
105
87
74
16
1
2
3
5
7
9
12
14
18
23
30
39
52
70
97
137
200
301
455
653
787
732
563
406
293
219
168
133
108
90
17
1
2
3
4
6
8
10
11
15
19
25
32
42
55
75
103
145
211
315
476
681
820
762
585
421
304
226
174
137
112
18
1
2
3
4
5
7
9
10
13
17
21
27
34
45
59
79
108
152
221
329
496
709
852
791
607
435
314
233
179
142
19
1
1
2
3
5
6
8
9
11
14
18
23
29
37
48
62
83
114
159
231
343
516
737
884
820
628
450
325
241
185
20
1
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
10
13
16
20
24
31
39
50
66
88
119
167
240
357
536
764
916
849
649
465
335
248
21
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
11
14
17
21
26
33
42
53
69
92
124
174
250
371
556
792
948
878
671
480
345
22
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
12
15
18
22
28
35
44
56
73
96
130
181
260
385
576
818
980
906
692
494
23
0
0
2
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
11
13
16
19
24
29
37
46
59
76
100
135
188
270
399
596
846
1012
935
713
24
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
8
10
12
14
17
21
25
31
39
48
61
79
104
140
195
279
412
616
873
1044
964
25
0
0
1
1
3
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
13
15
18
22
27
33
40
50
64
82
108
146
202
289
426
635
901
1075
26
0
0
1
1
2
3
4
4
5
6
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
28
34
42
53
67
86
112
151
209
298
440
655
928
27
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
12
14
17
20
24
29
36
44
54
69
89
116
156
216
308
453
674
28
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
5
5
6
8
9
11
13
15
18
21
26
31
37
46
57
72
92
120
161
223
317
467
29
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
6
7
8
10
11
13
16
19
22
27
32
39
48
59
74
95
124
166
230
327
30
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
6
8
9
10
12
14
17
20
23
28
33
40
49
61
77
98
128
172
236
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Payoff table C
3b: N
om
inal, post-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
9
14
16
17
20
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
2
12
18
21
22
26
29
28
26
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
8
3
18
25
28
29
34
37
35
32
29
27
25
23
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
4
26
36
39
40
45
49
45
40
36
33
29
27
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
5
35
52
56
56
62
67
60
53
46
40
36
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
18
16
15
15
14
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
6
40
71
81
81
89
95
83
70
60
51
44
39
34
31
28
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
14
12
12
12
11
11
7
35
80
109
115
129
137
119
97
80
66
56
48
42
37
33
30
27
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
11
8
25
68
119
151
176
193
172
139
111
89
73
61
52
45
39
35
31
28
26
24
22
20
19
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
9
18
50
102
157
200
236
237
201
158
123
98
79
66
56
48
42
37
33
30
27
25
23
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
10
12
34
74
129
176
226
279
275
229
177
136
107
86
71
59
51
44
39
35
31
28
26
23
22
20
19
17
16
15
14
11
9
24
51
92
129
173
253
318
312
255
195
148
115
92
75
63
54
46
41
36
32
29
27
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
12
7
18
36
63
89
121
189
284
357
348
281
212
160
124
98
80
67
57
49
43
38
34
30
28
25
23
21
20
19
17
13
5
13
26
45
62
84
131
210
316
395
382
305
229
172
132
104
84
70
59
51
45
39
35
32
29
26
24
22
21
19
14
4
10
19
33
45
60
91
145
232
347
433
416
331
246
183
140
110
89
74
62
53
46
41
36
33
30
27
25
23
21
15
3
8
15
25
34
44
66
102
161
254
379
470
449
355
262
194
148
116
93
77
65
56
48
43
38
34
31
28
26
24
16
3
6
12
19
26
34
49
73
112
176
277
410
506
481
378
278
206
156
122
98
81
68
58
50
44
39
35
32
29
26
17
2
5
10
15
20
26
37
54
81
123
192
300
440
541
513
402
294
217
164
127
102
84
70
60
52
46
41
36
33
30
18
2
4
8
12
16
21
29
42
60
89
134
207
322
471
576
544
425
310
227
171
133
107
87
73
62
54
47
41
37
34
19
2
4
7
10
14
17
24
33
46
66
97
145
223
344
500
611
575
448
326
238
179
139
111
91
76
64
56
49
43
39
20
1
3
6
9
11
14
19
27
37
51
72
105
156
238
365
530
645
606
470
341
249
186
144
115
94
79
67
58
50
44
21
1
2
5
7
10
12
16
22
30
40
56
78
112
166
253
386
559
679
636
492
357
259
194
150
119
97
81
69
59
52
22
1
2
4
6
8
10
14
18
24
32
44
60
84
120
177
267
407
588
712
666
514
372
270
202
156
124
101
84
71
61
23
1
2
4
5
7
8
12
15
20
27
35
48
65
90
128
187
282
428
616
745
695
536
387
280
209
161
128
104
87
73
24
1
2
3
5
6
8
10
13
17
22
29
38
51
69
95
135
197
296
449
645
778
725
558
402
291
217
167
132
108
89
25
1
2
3
4
6
7
9
11
15
19
24
32
41
55
73
101
143
207
311
469
673
811
754
580
417
301
224
172
136
111
26
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
13
16
21
26
34
44
58
78
107
150
218
325
490
701
843
783
601
432
312
232
178
141
27
1
1
2
3
4
5
7
9
11
14
18
22
28
36
47
61
82
112
157
227
339
510
728
875
813
623
447
322
239
183
28
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
12
15
19
24
30
39
50
65
86
117
164
237
353
530
755
908
842
644
461
332
247
29
1
1
2
3
4
4
6
7
9
11
13
17
21
26
32
41
52
68
90
123
171
247
367
550
784
940
870
666
477
343
30
0
1
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
10
12
15
18
22
27
34
43
55
72
95
128
179
257
381
570
811
972
899
687
491
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Payoff table C
4a: R
eal, post-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
18
26
35
40
36
29
26
23
17
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
2
12
18
25
34
40
38
35
32
25
17
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
3
9
12
18
25
34
39
40
39
34
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
7
9
12
17
25
32
35
38
40
34
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
5
7
9
12
17
23
26
29
36
40
35
26
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
4
5
7
9
12
16
18
20
27
36
40
35
26
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
3
4
5
7
9
11
12
14
19
26
35
40
35
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
8
3
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
13
18
26
35
39
35
25
18
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
9
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
9
13
18
25
34
39
35
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
10
2
2
3
3
4
5
5
6
7
9
12
18
25
34
39
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
11
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
34
39
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
12
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
34
38
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
13
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
33
38
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
14
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
24
33
38
34
25
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
2
15
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
24
33
38
33
25
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
16
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
9
12
17
24
33
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
17
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
9
12
17
24
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
18
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
12
16
24
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
19
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
12
16
23
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
21
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
32
36
33
24
17
12
22
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
24
16
23
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
24
24
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
25
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
26
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
22
28
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
11
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
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Payoff table C
4b: R
eal, post-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
9
7
5
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
12
9
7
6
5
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
18
13
9
7
7
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
26
18
13
10
9
8
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
35
26
19
14
12
11
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
40
36
27
20
18
16
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
7
35
40
36
29
26
23
17
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
8
25
34
40
38
35
32
25
17
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
9
18
25
34
39
40
39
34
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
10
12
17
25
32
35
38
40
34
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
11
9
12
17
23
26
29
36
40
35
26
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
7
9
12
16
18
20
27
36
40
35
26
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
5
7
9
11
12
14
19
26
35
40
35
25
18
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
14
4
5
6
8
9
10
13
18
26
35
39
35
25
18
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
15
3
4
5
6
7
7
9
13
18
25
34
39
35
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
16
3
3
4
5
5
6
7
9
12
18
25
34
39
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
17
2
3
3
4
4
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
34
39
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
18
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
34
38
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
19
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
25
33
38
34
25
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
20
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
24
33
38
34
25
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
21
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
17
24
33
38
33
25
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
2
2
22
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
9
12
17
24
33
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
2
23
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
9
12
17
24
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
2
24
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
12
16
24
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
3
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
12
16
23
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
4
26
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
32
37
33
24
17
12
8
6
5
27
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
32
36
33
24
17
12
8
6
28
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
24
16
11
8
29
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
24
16
11
30
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
16
23
31
36
32
24
16
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A
ppendix D
Payoff T
ables for treatm
ents w
ith positive shock
Payoff table D
1a: N
om
inal, pre-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
38
74
85
78
67
56
48
42
37
33
31
29
31
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
19
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
12
11
2
29
76
112
115
99
80
67
56
48
42
38
36
38
39
36
33
30
27
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
3
20
58
114
151
145
120
96
77
64
54
48
45
47
48
45
40
36
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
18
17
15
15
14
13
4
14
40
88
152
189
175
141
111
89
73
63
58
59
61
55
49
43
38
34
31
28
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
5
9
27
60
117
190
229
207
164
128
102
85
76
77
79
71
61
53
46
41
36
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
18
17
15
6
7
18
41
80
146
228
269
240
189
147
118
103
105
106
93
79
66
57
49
43
38
34
30
27
25
23
21
20
18
17
7
5
14
28
53
100
175
266
309
275
217
171
146
147
147
126
103
85
71
60
52
45
40
35
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
8
4
10
21
37
67
119
202
303
351
315
254
214
214
213
178
142
113
91
75
63
54
47
41
37
33
30
27
25
23
21
9
3
8
15
27
47
80
138
229
338
394
364
317
318
317
261
201
154
121
97
80
67
57
49
43
38
34
31
28
25
23
10
3
6
12
21
34
56
93
155
253
370
438
436
449
456
387
295
220
166
129
103
84
70
59
51
45
39
35
32
29
26
11
2
5
10
16
26
41
65
105
172
273
394
477
520
556
537
437
324
237
177
136
108
88
73
62
53
46
41
36
33
30
12
2
4
8
13
20
31
47
74
116
184
284
390
449
508
598
592
478
350
253
187
143
113
92
76
64
55
48
42
38
34
13
2
4
6
10
16
24
36
54
82
126
191
271
318
370
497
630
639
515
374
268
197
150
118
96
79
67
57
50
44
39
14
1
3
5
9
13
19
28
41
60
88
131
183
214
250
347
504
662
681
549
396
283
207
157
123
99
82
69
59
51
44
15
1
2
5
7
11
15
22
32
45
64
93
126
147
170
234
348
520
695
722
582
418
296
217
164
128
103
85
71
61
53
16
1
2
4
6
9
13
18
25
35
49
68
91
105
120
161
234
357
540
729
761
613
439
311
226
171
133
107
88
74
63
17
1
2
3
5
8
11
15
20
28
38
52
68
77
88
115
163
241
369
562
762
799
644
460
324
235
177
138
110
91
76
18
1
2
3
5
7
9
13
17
23
31
41
52
59
67
86
117
168
250
383
585
796
836
674
480
338
244
184
143
114
93
19
1
2
3
4
6
8
11
14
19
25
33
41
47
53
66
87
121
174
259
399
608
829
872
703
500
350
253
190
147
118
20
1
1
2
4
5
7
9
12
16
21
27
33
38
42
52
68
91
126
181
269
414
632
862
908
731
519
364
262
196
152
21
1
1
2
3
4
6
8
11
14
18
22
27
31
34
42
54
70
95
131
188
280
430
655
895
943
759
538
376
271
202
22
1
1
2
3
4
5
7
9
12
14
19
23
26
29
35
43
56
73
99
137
196
291
446
679
927
978
787
557
389
279
23
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
13
16
19
22
24
29
36
45
58
77
103
142
203
302
461
702
959
1012
814
575
401
24
0
0
2
2
3
4
6
7
9
11
14
17
19
20
25
30
37
47
61
80
107
148
211
312
477
726
991
1046
841
594
25
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
12
15
16
18
21
26
31
39
50
64
83
111
154
219
323
493
749
1022
1080
868
26
0
0
1
1
3
4
5
6
7
9
11
13
14
16
18
22
27
33
41
52
66
87
116
159
226
334
509
772
1054
1113
27
0
0
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
11
12
14
16
19
23
28
34
43
54
69
90
120
165
234
345
524
795
1085
28
0
0
1
1
2
2
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
12
14
17
20
24
29
36
45
56
72
93
124
170
241
355
540
818
29
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
13
15
18
21
25
31
38
47
58
74
97
129
176
249
366
555
30
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
13
16
18
22
26
32
39
48
61
77
100
133
181
256
376
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Payoff table D
1b: N
om
inal, pre-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
13
18
20
20
20
19
18
18
17
16
16
17
18
18
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
12
11
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
2
19
26
28
27
26
24
23
21
20
19
19
20
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
3
28
38
40
37
34
31
29
26
24
23
23
24
25
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
11
11
10
10
9
4
37
56
59
53
47
41
37
33
30
28
27
28
30
28
26
24
22
21
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
12
11
11
10
5
38
74
86
79
67
57
49
43
38
34
33
35
36
34
31
28
26
24
22
20
19
17
16
15
14
14
13
12
12
11
6
29
76
113
116
100
82
68
57
49
44
41
43
45
42
38
34
30
28
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
13
13
12
7
20
58
114
152
146
121
97
79
66
57
53
55
56
52
46
41
36
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
18
16
15
15
14
13
8
14
40
88
152
191
177
144
113
91
77
69
71
73
66
57
50
44
38
34
31
28
25
23
21
20
18
17
16
15
14
9
9
27
60
117
190
230
210
168
132
107
94
97
98
87
74
62
53
46
41
36
32
29
26
24
22
20
19
18
16
15
10
7
18
40
80
145
228
270
245
196
156
134
136
137
118
97
80
67
57
49
43
38
34
30
27
25
23
21
20
18
17
11
5
14
28
53
99
173
265
312
284
231
196
197
198
166
133
106
86
71
60
52
45
39
35
31
28
26
24
22
20
19
12
4
10
21
37
67
118
200
301
354
331
291
293
294
244
188
145
114
92
76
63
54
47
41
37
33
29
27
24
22
21
13
3
8
15
27
47
80
136
225
333
398
399
414
423
361
277
207
157
122
97
80
67
57
49
43
38
34
31
28
25
23
14
3
6
12
21
34
56
92
153
246
358
437
480
517
501
410
305
224
168
129
103
84
70
59
51
45
39
35
32
29
26
15
2
5
10
16
26
41
65
104
166
258
358
414
472
558
555
450
330
240
178
137
108
88
73
62
53
46
41
36
33
29
16
2
4
8
13
20
31
47
73
113
174
249
293
343
464
591
601
486
354
255
188
144
113
92
76
64
55
48
42
37
34
17
2
4
6
10
16
24
35
53
80
119
167
197
232
324
473
623
643
520
376
269
198
150
118
95
79
66
57
49
43
39
18
1
3
5
9
13
19
28
40
58
84
116
136
158
218
326
490
657
684
553
398
283
207
157
123
99
82
69
59
51
44
19
1
2
5
7
11
15
22
31
44
62
83
97
112
150
220
336
510
690
723
584
419
297
217
164
128
103
85
71
61
53
20
1
2
4
6
9
13
18
25
34
47
62
71
82
108
152
227
349
532
724
761
615
440
311
226
170
133
106
87
73
63
21
1
2
3
5
8
11
15
20
28
37
48
55
62
80
110
158
236
363
556
758
798
644
460
324
235
177
137
110
90
76
22
1
2
3
5
7
9
13
17
23
30
38
43
49
62
82
114
164
246
379
579
791
834
673
480
337
244
183
142
114
93
23
1
2
3
4
6
8
11
14
19
24
30
35
39
48
63
85
119
171
256
394
603
824
870
702
499
350
253
189
147
117
24
1
1
2
4
5
7
9
12
16
20
25
28
32
39
50
66
89
124
179
267
410
626
857
906
730
518
363
261
195
151
25
1
1
2
3
4
6
8
10
13
17
21
24
27
32
41
53
69
94
130
187
278
426
650
890
941
758
537
375
270
202
26
1
1
2
3
4
5
7
9
12
14
18
20
23
27
34
43
55
73
98
136
194
289
442
674
922
974
785
556
388
278
27
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
13
15
17
19
23
28
35
45
58
76
102
141
202
299
458
698
954
1009
812
574
400
28
0
0
2
2
3
4
6
7
9
11
13
15
17
20
24
30
37
47
60
79
106
147
210
310
474
721
986
1043
839
592
29
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
12
13
15
17
21
25
31
39
49
63
83
111
153
217
321
490
744
1017
1076
865
30
0
0
1
1
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
12
13
15
18
22
26
33
41
51
66
86
115
158
225
332
505
767
1049
1109
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Payoff table D
2a: R
eal, pre-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
38
37
28
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
29
38
37
29
20
13
10
7
5
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
3
20
29
38
38
29
20
14
10
7
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
4
14
20
29
38
38
29
20
14
10
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
5
9
14
20
29
38
38
30
21
14
10
8
6
6
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
7
9
14
20
29
38
38
30
21
15
11
9
8
8
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
5
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
31
22
16
12
11
11
8
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
4
5
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
32
23
18
16
15
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
3
4
5
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
33
26
24
23
17
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
10
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
40
36
35
33
26
18
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
11
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
27
36
40
40
40
36
27
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
12
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
18
26
33
35
36
40
37
28
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
13
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
17
23
24
26
33
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
14
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
15
16
18
23
32
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
1
15
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
11
12
16
22
31
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
16
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
8
9
11
15
21
30
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
17
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
6
6
8
10
14
21
30
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
3
18
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
10
14
20
29
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
19
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
7
10
14
20
29
38
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
5
7
10
13
20
29
37
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
21
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
20
28
37
38
29
20
13
9
7
22
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
38
29
20
13
9
23
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
20
13
24
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
20
25
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
26
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
36
37
27
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
27
36
28
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
27
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
9
13
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Payoff table D
2b: R
eal, pre-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
28
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
37
28
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
5
38
37
29
20
13
10
7
5
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
6
29
38
38
29
20
14
10
7
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
7
20
29
38
38
29
20
14
10
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
8
14
20
29
38
38
30
21
14
10
8
6
6
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
9
9
14
20
29
38
38
30
21
15
11
9
8
8
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
31
22
16
12
11
11
8
6
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
5
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
32
23
18
16
15
12
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
4
5
7
9
13
20
29
38
39
33
26
24
23
17
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
40
36
35
33
26
18
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
14
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
27
36
40
40
40
36
27
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
15
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
18
26
33
35
36
40
37
28
19
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
16
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
17
23
24
26
33
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
17
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
12
15
16
18
23
32
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
18
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
11
11
12
16
22
31
39
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
1
19
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
8
8
9
11
15
21
30
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
2
20
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
6
6
8
10
14
21
30
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
3
2
21
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
10
14
20
29
38
38
29
20
14
9
7
5
4
3
3
22
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
7
10
14
20
29
38
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
3
23
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
5
7
10
13
20
29
37
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
4
24
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
20
28
37
38
29
20
13
9
7
5
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
38
29
20
13
9
7
26
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
20
13
9
27
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
20
13
28
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
37
37
29
20
29
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
28
36
37
29
30
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
7
9
13
19
27
36
37
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Payoff table D
3a: N
om
inal, post-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
38
78
112
133
142
142
136
128
120
111
103
96
89
84
78
74
70
66
63
60
58
56
54
54
54
56
58
58
57
56
2
34
75
117
149
167
170
166
156
145
133
123
113
104
97
90
84
79
74
70
67
64
62
60
59
60
62
64
64
63
61
3
29
68
113
156
187
200
200
190
177
162
147
135
123
113
104
97
90
84
79
75
71
68
66
65
66
68
70
70
69
66
4
24
58
102
151
196
224
235
230
215
197
179
161
147
133
122
112
103
96
90
84
80
76
74
72
73
75
77
78
76
73
5
20
48
88
137
189
235
263
270
259
240
218
196
176
159
144
131
120
111
103
96
90
86
82
80
81
83
86
86
84
80
6
16
40
73
117
171
228
275
301
304
290
266
239
214
191
171
155
140
128
118
109
102
97
92
90
90
93
96
96
93
89
7
13
32
60
97
146
205
266
315
340
339
320
291
261
232
206
184
166
150
137
126
117
110
105
101
102
105
108
108
104
99
8
11
27
49
80
122
176
239
304
355
379
375
351
317
283
250
222
198
177
160
146
135
126
119
115
115
118
122
121
117
111
9
9
22
41
65
100
146
205
274
342
394
418
411
382
344
305
269
238
212
190
172
157
145
137
131
131
135
139
138
132
125
10
8
18
34
54
82
120
170
234
308
380
435
457
447
414
372
328
289
255
227
203
184
169
158
151
150
155
159
158
151
142
11
7
16
28
45
68
98
140
195
263
342
418
475
497
484
447
400
352
310
273
243
218
199
185
176
174
179
184
181
173
162
12
6
14
24
37
56
81
115
160
219
292
376
456
515
537
521
480
429
378
332
293
261
236
218
206
203
209
215
212
200
186
13
5
12
20
32
47
67
95
131
179
243
321
409
494
556
577
559
515
460
405
356
316
283
259
244
240
246
253
248
234
216
14
4
10
18
27
40
56
79
107
147
199
266
349
442
532
596
618
599
551
492
435
384
343
311
292
286
294
301
295
276
253
15
4
8
15
24
34
48
66
90
121
163
219
290
377
475
569
636
659
638
589
528
468
417
377
352
344
353
362
353
328
299
16
4
8
14
21
30
41
56
75
101
134
179
238
313
405
507
605
676
701
681
630
568
509
460
428
417
428
439
426
395
357
17
3
7
12
18
26
35
48
64
85
112
148
195
257
336
432
539
641
716
744
725
676
616
561
522
509
522
535
519
479
430
18
3
6
11
16
23
31
41
55
72
94
123
161
211
275
358
458
569
676
755
787
773
728
676
634
620
636
652
633
584
522
19
3
6
9
14
20
27
36
47
62
80
103
134
174
226
293
379
483
598
709
793
832
825
792
757
745
766
786
767
711
637
20
2
5
9
13
18
24
32
41
53
68
88
112
145
186
241
311
400
506
625
740
829
876
883
871
871
898
923
911
857
774
21
2
4
8
11
16
21
28
36
46
59
75
95
121
155
199
255
328
419
528
649
767
862
920
946
967
1000
1033
1039
1003
927
22
2
4
7
10
14
19
25
32
41
51
65
82
103
130
165
211
269
343
436
546
668
787
886
954
1000
1040
1080
1113
1117
1073
23
2
4
6
9
13
17
22
28
36
45
56
71
88
111
139
175
222
282
357
451
561
680
795
890
957
1000
1044
1104
1159
1175
24
2
4
6
9
12
15
20
25
32
40
50
62
76
95
118
148
185
233
294
369
462
568
679
781
855
898
940
1017
1114
1195
25
2
3
5
8
11
14
18
23
29
35
44
54
67
82
101
125
156
194
243
304
378
467
564
658
728
766
805
883
998
1125
26
1
3
5
7
10
13
16
21
26
32
39
48
58
71
88
107
132
163
203
251
311
383
463
543
604
636
669
740
852
993
27
1
2
5
7
9
12
15
19
23
29
35
42
52
62
76
93
114
139
171
209
258
315
380
445
495
522
549
609
707
840
28
1
2
4
6
8
11
14
17
21
26
31
38
46
56
67
81
98
119
145
177
216
261
313
365
406
428
451
499
580
694
29
1
2
4
5
8
10
13
16
19
23
28
34
41
49
59
71
86
103
125
151
182
219
261
302
335
353
371
411
476
569
30
1
2
4
5
7
9
12
14
18
21
26
31
37
44
53
63
75
90
108
129
155
185
219
252
279
294
309
340
393
467
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Payoff table D
3b: N
om
inal, post-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
13
22
27
31
34
35
36
35
36
36
35
35
34
33
33
32
32
31
31
30
30
30
31
32
33
34
34
33
33
32
2
16
26
33
37
39
40
41
41
40
40
39
38
38
37
36
35
34
34
33
33
32
32
33
35
36
36
36
36
35
34
3
19
32
39
44
46
47
47
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
36
35
35
36
37
39
39
39
38
37
36
4
23
38
47
52
55
55
55
54
53
51
50
48
47
45
44
43
41
40
39
39
38
38
39
40
42
42
42
41
40
39
5
28
46
58
64
66
66
65
63
61
59
57
55
53
51
49
47
46
44
43
42
41
41
42
44
45
46
45
44
43
42
6
33
56
71
77
80
79
77
75
72
68
65
62
60
57
55
53
51
49
47
46
45
45
46
48
49
50
49
48
47
44
7
37
66
85
94
97
96
93
89
84
80
76
72
68
65
62
59
56
54
52
51
50
49
50
52
54
54
53
52
50
49
8
39
74
100
113
119
117
113
107
100
94
88
83
78
74
70
66
63
60
58
56
55
54
55
57
59
59
58
57
55
53
9
38
78
112
133
143
143
137
129
121
112
104
97
90
85
79
75
71
67
65
62
60
60
60
63
65
65
64
62
60
57
10
34
76
117
149
168
172
167
158
146
134
124
114
106
98
91
85
80
76
72
69
67
66
67
69
72
72
71
68
65
62
11
29
68
114
157
188
202
202
192
178
163
149
136
125
115
106
98
92
86
82
78
75
74
74
77
80
80
78
75
72
68
12
24
58
103
152
196
226
237
232
217
199
181
164
149
135
124
114
106
98
93
88
84
83
83
86
89
89
87
83
79
75
13
20
48
88
137
190
236
264
272
262
243
221
199
179
161
146
133
123
113
106
100
95
93
93
97
100
100
97
93
88
83
14
16
40
73
117
171
228
276
303
307
292
269
242
217
194
174
158
144
132
122
114
109
106
106
109
113
113
109
104
98
92
15
14
32
60
97
146
205
266
315
342
342
323
295
264
236
210
188
170
155
142
132
125
120
120
125
129
128
123
117
110
102
16
11
27
49
80
122
176
239
304
356
381
378
355
322
287
255
227
203
183
167
154
144
139
138
143
148
146
140
132
123
115
17
9
22
41
65
100
146
205
273
342
396
421
415
387
350
311
275
244
219
198
181
169
161
160
165
171
168
161
151
140
130
18
8
18
34
54
82
120
170
234
307
380
436
460
452
420
378
336
297
264
236
215
199
189
187
193
199
196
187
174
160
147
19
7
16
28
45
68
98
140
194
262
341
418
476
500
489
454
409
362
321
286
257
237
224
221
227
235
231
218
201
184
168
20
6
14
24
37
56
80
114
159
218
291
374
456
516
541
528
490
441
391
347
311
284
267
263
271
279
274
257
236
214
194
21
5
12
21
32
47
67
94
131
179
241
319
407
493
557
582
567
527
475
424
379
345
323
316
326
335
328
306
279
251
226
22
5
10
18
27
40
56
78
107
147
198
265
347
440
530
597
623
609
567
514
463
420
392
384
395
406
396
368
333
298
265
23
4
9
15
24
34
48
66
90
121
163
217
288
374
472
566
636
666
653
612
560
512
478
468
482
495
482
446
401
356
314
24
4
8
14
21
30
41
56
75
101
134
178
236
310
401
502
601
676
709
699
662
617
581
570
587
604
588
544
487
430
377
25
3
7
12
18
26
35
48
64
85
112
147
194
254
332
426
532
635
714
753
750
723
694
686
707
728
713
662
594
523
455
26
3
6
11
16
23
31
41
55
72
94
122
160
209
272
353
450
559
666
750
797
807
799
801
828
855
846
798
723
638
554
27
3
6
10
14
20
27
36
47
61
79
103
133
172
223
289
372
472
584
694
783
840
867
889
923
957
965
934
866
774
676
28
2
5
9
13
18
24
32
41
53
68
87
112
143
184
237
305
390
492
605
716
809
874
920
960
1000
1033
1040
1002
923
820
29
2
4
8
11
16
21
28
36
46
59
75
95
121
154
196
251
320
406
507
618
726
816
880
923
967
1025
1079
1097
1059
974
30
2
4
7
10
14
19
25
32
41
51
65
81
102
129
163
207
263
332
418
516
620
716
787
828
871
944
1037
1115
1145
1110
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Payoff table D
4a: R
eal, post-shock, type x
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
38
39
37
33
28
24
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
34
38
39
37
33
28
24
20
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
29
34
38
39
37
33
29
24
20
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
4
24
29
34
38
39
37
34
29
24
20
16
13
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
5
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
16
14
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
6
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
16
14
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
7
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
17
14
12
10
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
8
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
17
14
12
10
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
9
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
25
20
17
14
12
10
9
7
7
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
10
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
34
30
25
21
17
14
12
10
9
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
11
7
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
25
21
17
14
12
10
9
8
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
12
6
7
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
25
21
17
15
12
11
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
6
13
5
6
7
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
26
21
18
15
13
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
7
14
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
35
31
26
22
18
16
14
12
11
11
11
11
10
8
15
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
35
31
26
22
19
16
15
14
14
13
13
11
10
16
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
36
32
27
23
20
18
17
16
16
15
14
12
17
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
36
32
28
24
22
20
20
20
19
17
14
18
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
33
38
40
39
37
33
29
26
25
24
24
23
20
17
19
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
28
33
37
40
40
38
34
32
30
29
29
27
25
21
20
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
24
28
33
37
39
40
38
36
35
35
34
33
30
26
21
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
28
32
37
39
40
39
39
38
38
37
35
31
22
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
27
32
36
39
40
40
40
40
40
39
36
23
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
27
31
35
37
38
38
39
39
40
39
24
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
15
18
22
26
30
33
34
35
35
36
38
40
25
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
15
18
21
25
27
29
29
30
32
34
38
26
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
15
17
20
23
24
24
25
26
29
33
27
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
14
17
19
20
20
20
22
24
28
28
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
14
15
16
16
17
18
20
23
29
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
13
13
14
14
15
16
19
30
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
6
7
8
10
11
11
11
11
12
14
16
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Payoff table D
4b: R
eal, post-shock, type y
A
verage price of other firm
s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Selling price
1
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
4
23
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
5
28
23
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
6
33
28
24
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
7
37
33
28
24
19
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
8
39
37
33
28
24
20
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
9
38
39
37
33
29
24
20
16
13
11
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
10
34
38
39
37
34
29
24
20
16
13
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
11
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
16
14
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
12
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
16
14
11
10
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
13
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
17
14
12
10
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
24
20
17
14
12
10
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
15
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
39
38
34
29
25
20
17
14
12
10
9
7
7
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
3
16
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
34
30
25
21
17
14
12
10
9
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
4
4
17
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
25
21
17
14
12
10
9
8
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
18
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
25
21
17
15
12
11
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
6
6
5
19
7
8
9
11
14
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
38
35
30
26
21
18
15
13
11
10
10
9
9
9
8
7
6
6
20
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
35
31
26
22
18
16
14
12
11
11
11
11
10
8
7
6
21
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
35
31
26
22
19
16
15
14
14
13
13
11
10
9
8
22
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
36
32
27
23
20
18
17
16
16
15
14
12
10
9
23
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
34
38
40
39
36
32
28
24
22
20
20
20
19
17
14
12
10
24
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
29
33
38
40
39
37
33
29
26
25
24
24
23
20
17
15
13
25
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
20
24
28
33
37
40
40
38
34
32
30
29
29
27
25
21
18
15
26
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
24
28
33
37
39
40
38
36
35
35
34
33
30
26
22
18
27
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
28
32
37
39
40
39
39
38
38
37
35
31
27
23
28
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
27
32
36
39
40
40
40
40
40
39
36
32
27
29
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
16
19
23
27
31
35
37
38
38
39
39
40
39
37
32
30
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
8
9
11
13
15
18
22
26
30
33
34
35
35
36
38
40
39
37
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Appendix E: Additional pre-shock tables in treatments with computerized opponents (RC
and NC)
Pre-shock, Type x Pre-shock, Type y
Your price decision Average price of the other
three (computerized) firms
Your price decision Average price of the other
three (computerized) firms
1 20 1 6
2 20 2 6
3 20 3 6
4 20 4 6
5 21 5 6
6 21 6 7
7 21 7 7
8 21 8 7
9 21 9 7
10 21 10 7
11 21 11 7
12 21 12 8
13 21 13 9
14 21 14 10
15 22 15 11
16 22 16 11
17 22 17 12
18 22 18 12
19 23 19 13
20 23 20 14
21 24 21 15
22 24 22 15
23 24 23 15
24 25 24 15
25 25 25 15
26 25 26 15
27 25 27 15
28 25 28 15
29 25 29 15
30 25 30 15
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Appendix E: Additional post-shock tables in treatments with computerized opponents (RC
and NC)
Post-shock, Type x Post-shock, Type y
Your price decision Average price of the other
three (computerized) firms
Your price decision Average price of the other
three (computerized) firms
1 7 1 3
2 7 2 3
3 7 3 3
4 7 4 3
5 7 5 4
6 7 6 4
7 7 7 5
8 8 8 5
9 9 9 5
10 10 10 5
11 11 11 5
12 12 12 5
13 13 13 5
14 14 14 6
15 15 15 7
16 16 16 8
17 17 17 9
18 18 18 10
19 19 19 11
20 20 20 12
21 21 21 13
22 22 22 14
23 23 23 15
24 24 24 16
25 25 25 17
26 26 26 18
27 27 27 19
28 28 28 20
29 28 29 21
30 28 30 22
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Table 1: Treatment conditions
Payoffs in Real Terms Payoffs in Nominal Terms
Computerized
Opponents
Real treatment with computerized
opponents (RC): 22 groups with 1
human and n-1 computerized
players in each group
Nominal treatment with
computerized opponents (NC): 24
groups with 1 human and n-1
computerized players in each group
Measures nominal inertia caused
by individual optimization errors
that are not due to money illusion
Comparison with RC measures
nominal inertia caused by
individual-level money illusion
Human
Opponents
Real treatment with human
opponents (RH):
10 groups with n human players in
each group
Nominal treatment with human
opponents (NH):
11 groups with n human players in
each group
Comparison with RC measures
nominal inertia caused by the
difficulties of coordinating
expectations and actions
Comparison with RH measures the
total (direct and indirect) effects of
money illusion in a strategic setting
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Table 2: Experimental parameters (negative money shock)
Representation of payoffs in the nominal frame
iiP pi−
Representation of payoffs in the real frame ipi
Group size n = 4
Information feedback in period t P i− , ipi
Real equilibrium payoff 40
Choice variable { }30,...,2,1∈iP
Length of pre- and post-shock phase in treatment with
computerized opponents
T = 10
A
ll 
pe
rio
ds
Length of pre- and post-shock phase in treatment with
human opponents
T = 20
Money supply M0 42
Average equilibrium price P* and average equilibrium
expectation for the whole group
18
Equilibrium price for type x 9
Equilibrium expectation P e i−  for type x 21
Equilibrium price for type y 27
Pr
e-
sh
oc
k 
va
lu
es
Equilibrium expectation P e i−  for type y 15
Money supply M1 14
Average equilibrium price P* and average equilibrium
expectation for the whole group
6
Equilibrium price for type x 3
Equilibrium expectation P e i−  for type x 7
Equilibrium price for type y 9
Po
st
-s
ho
ck
 v
al
ue
s
Equilibrium expectation P e i−  for type y 5
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Table 3: Evolution of prices and efficiency losses over time
Average price Average efficiency loss (percent)
Computerized opponents Human opponents Computerized opponents Human opponents
period Real
(RC)
Nominal
(NC)
Real
(RH)
Nominal
(NH)
Real
(RC)
Nominal
 (NC)
Real
(RH)
Nominal
 (NH)
-20 17.6 18.5 14.4 19.0
-19 18.2 19.3 21.5 14.6
-18 17.8 19.1 14.1 10.2
-17 17.7 19.4 9.5 11.7
-16 17.9 19.2 8.8 6.8
-15 18.3 19.1 10.8 13.2
-14 17.6 18.2 8.0 9.9
-13 17.9 18.6 8.2 4.2
-12 17.9 18.7 6.3 3.1
-11 17.6 18.3 5.5 7.5
-10 17.9 15.2 17.8 18.4 1.0 16.4 9.4 3.4
-9 18.1 17.0 17.5 18.2 0.5 12.6 3.6 1.6
-8 17.8 17.2 17.6 19.0 1.6 9.0 3.3 6.0
-7 18.0 18.0 17.7 18.3 0.5 3.0 2.4 1.8
-6 17.6 17.2 17.6 18.2 2.4 10.4 10.9 1.3
-5 18.0 17.7 18.1 18.3 0.3 5.4 7.0 2.7
-4 18.0 18.1 18.1 18.4 0.0 3.5 7.3 2.5
-3 17.8 16.1 17.6 18.6 1.3 12.6 3.7 2.8
-2 18.4 18.3 17.9 18.2 2.3 1.9 2.2 0.7
-1 18.0 17.0 18.0 18.2 0.0 5.3 0.9 0.9
1 6.0 8.0 9.1 13.1 0.0 10.4 51.8 65.1
2 7.0 7.4 7.7 12.9 3.6 8.2 20.0 47.5
3 6.0 6.8 7.4 11.4 0.0 4.4 15.0 34.8
4 6.0 6.4 6.9 10.4 0.6 6.5 9.1 27.4
5 6.0 6.9 7.0 9.9 0.0 8.0 14.8 17.4
6 6.0 6.8 6.6 10.2 0.0 15.6 7.7 15.9
7 6.0 7.5 6.3 9.7 0.0 9.3 4.5 16.4
8 6.0 6.8 6.4 9.1 0.0 15.5 4.6 10.7
9 6.0 6.5 6.3 8.7 0.0 4.3 3.8 9.5
10 5.9 6.5 6.8 8.6 1.6 3.8 11.0 13.8
11 6.1 8.1 4.6 8.2
12 6.2 7.6 3.3 6.4
13 6.2 7.2 2.1 6.2
14 6.2 6.9 2.8 4.6
15 6.1 6.7 2.6 2.6
16 6.1 7.3 2.1 9.6
17 6.0 6.8 0.9 5.2
18 6.1 7.2 1.8 14.2
19 6.1 7.5 1.4 12.5
20 6.2 7.0 3.0 2.4
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Table 4: Deviation from post-shock equilibrium in treatments with human opponents
uddPP
t
tt
t
ttit
==
+−+=−
20
1
19
1
* )1(βα
where itP
−  denotes the average price of group i in period t and dt = 1 if the price observation in
period t comes from the RH.
Real treatment
with human opponents
(RH)
Nominal treatment
with human opponents
(NH)
Post-shock
period
Coefficient αt Coefficient βt
1 3.10*** 7.14***
2 1.68** 6.86***
3 1.43 5.43***
4 0.90 4.41***
5 1.00 3.86***
6 0.55 4.18***
7 0.25 3.77***
8 0.35 3.05***
9 0.25 2.70***
10 0.83 2.59***
11 0.13 2.05***
12 0.23 1.61**
13 0.18 1.18
14 0.18 0.89
15 0.10 0.70
16 0.13 1.25
17 0.03 0.80
18 0.13 1.20
19 0.05 1.45
20 - 0.95
*** = significant at the 1 percent level, ** = significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 5: Evolution of prices over time in treatments with positive shock
Average price
Period Real
(RH)
Nominal
(NH)
-15 13.0 14.9
-14 13.0 14.7
-13 12.7 14.6
-12 12.7 14.3
-11 12.7 14.3
-10 12.5 14.1
-9 12.5 13.6
-8 12.5 13.4
-7 12.4 13.7
-6 12.5 13.8
-5 12.5 13.8
-4 12.5 13.9
-3 12.5 13.6
-2 12.6 13.1
-1 12.5 13.1
1 22.5 20.5
2 24.3 22.8
3 24.8 24.1
4 24.9 24.8
5 25.0 25.0
6 25.0 25.1
7 25.0 25.2
8 25.0 25.1
9 25.0 25.0
10 25.0 25.2
11 25.0 25.2
12 25.0 25.0
13 25.0 25.0
14 24.3 24.5
15 24.6 24.9
A
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F
igure 1:  Evolution of average prices
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Figure 2:  Evolution of average expectations
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Figure 3:  Differences in deviations from equilibrium across the negative and the positive shock
